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ABSTRACT
While Australia has long adopted the corporate veil piercing doctrine from the UK 
model, China has only recently enacted veil piercing provisions in 2006. This thesis 
compares Australia’s long standing veil piercing doctrine and China’s recent veil 
piercing enactment to determine which jurisdiction provides better veil piercing laws 
in protecting creditors’ interests. The findings of this thesis are significant for 
creditors such as foreign lenders or business partners who wish to choose a well-
protected and safe market in which to invest. 
This thesis will provide a discussion and comparison on Australia’s and China’s 
directors’ duties to prevent insolvent trading and instances in which veil piercing can 
occur. There will be an addition of another jurisdiction, United States in lieu of 
China, because China’s insolvent trading laws are based on US laws and there is a 
dearth of academic literature in the area of insolvent trading laws in China.
This thesis will argue that Australia has better veil piercing laws to protect creditors’ 
interests compared to China due to the very limited scope of China’s veil piercing 
laws, which are drafted in vague terms and the Chinese civil legal system (in which 
the doctrine of precedent is absent). In addition, the author suggests that this is due to 
the fact that many companies are still State Owned Enterprises in China, subject to 
strong political influence and therefore protective of state shareholders.
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1I INTRODUCTION
In 2014, about ten thousand companies in Australia went into external 
administration. 1 This presents a complication for creditors attempting to 
recover their debts from these insolvent companies, as they will either fail to 
recover their debts or will only able to recover a portion of them.2 This is 
because these companies may not have enough assets to repay their creditors 
and in some circumstances, the controllers of these companies may have 
directly or indirectly caused this. 
However, the principle of ‘piercing the corporate-veil’ provides some 
assurance to these creditors in certain circumstances where it can be invoked. 
For example, creditors may have legal recourse against directors personally, 
if they breach their fiduciary obligations. 3
This thesis focuses on a comparison between two jurisdictions, Australia’s
and People’s Republic of China (‘China’) veil piercing laws. The objective of 
this comparison is to determine which jurisdiction provides better veil 
piercing laws to protect creditors’ interests. The discussion and analysis are in 
the subsequent chapters of this thesis, Chapter II – Directors’ Duties 
(Insolvent Trading) and Chapter III – Piercing the Corporate Veil. This thesis 
will only discuss the veil-piercing laws in relation to contract creditors 
                                               
1 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ‘Australian Insolvency Statistics’ 
(Working Paper, Australian Securities and Investment Commission, November 2014).
2 Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) s 55; Mark Wellard, ‘Lifting the Corporate 
Veil: Personal Liability of Receivers, Administrators and Liquidators’ (2000) 12(10) The 
Australian Insolvency Journal 4.
3 Philip Lipton, Abe Herzberg and Michelle Welsh, Understanding Company Law (Thomson 
Reuters, 17th ed, 2014) 41.
2because contract creditors are more common in a company’s everyday 
transactions compared to creditors who may have action against the company 
in tort.
This thesis will be divided into four chapters. Chapter I – Introduction, will 
deliver an overarching description of limited liability and separate legal entity 
principles, explaining the ‘veil-piercing’ doctrines developed from these 
principles. 
Chapter II - Directors’ Duties (Insolvent Trading), will discuss a director’s 
duties in Australia and China in relation to insolvent trading. There will be an 
in-depth analysis of directors’ duties in relation to insolvent trading. There 
will also be a comparison between Australia and the United States (‘US’) in 
lieu of China because China’s insolvent trading laws are modelled on US’s
because there is a dearth of academic literature in China on this area of law. 
This Chapter will compare directors’ duties across both jurisdictions with 
particular focus on breaches of these duties, which trigger ‘veil-piercing’ 
action. 
Chapter III- Piercing the Corporate Veil compares and evaluates laws on the 
‘veil-piercing’ doctrine in both jurisdictions. It discusses the disparity 
between ‘veil-piercing’ laws.
Chapter IV- Conclusion, summarises each chapter succinctly and forms this 
thesis’ conclusion that Australia arguably accords better protection for 
creditors.
3‘Piercing the corporate veil’ describes the court’s action to hold shareholders 
and directors personally liable for the company’s debt. 4 Australia’s veil-
piercing doctrine is modelled on the United Kingdom’s (‘UK’) veil-piercing 
doctrine and its history can be traced back to the early 1910s in UK.5 Thus,
Australia’s veil-piercing doctrine has been developing over a century through 
cases and legislation.6 This development has provided an opportunity for
many academics to discuss and analyse the doctrine.7 This thesis will add 
novelty to this ongoing discussion of the doctrine by comparing it with 
another jurisdiction, China, because of its recent addition of veil-piercing 
doctrine to its Company Law. 
China has recently reformed its company law, Chinese Company Law 2006
(‘CCL’) by including the ‘veil piercing’ doctrine. 8 China is a rapidly 
                                               
4 Ibid.
5 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (Great Britain) Ltd [1916] 2 AC 307;
Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832; Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] UKHL 
5; Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] 1 Ch 433; Re Polly Peck International plc (in 
administration) [1996] 2 All ER 433; Benefit Strategies group Inc v Pride [2004] SASC 365; 
James Sleightholme, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Claims Enforcement’ (Speech delivered 
at Elborne Mitchel LL Lecture, Llyod’s Old Library, 22 August 2012) < 
http://www.elbornes.com/downloads/Lecture_Notes_-
_Piercing_the_Corporate_Veil_in_Claims_Enforcement.pdf>.
6 Electric Light and Power Supply Corporation Ltd v Cornack (1911) 11 SR (NSW) 350.
7 Christian Witting and James Rankin, ‘Tortious Liability of Corporate Groups: From 
Control to Coordination’ (2014) 22 Tort Law Review 91; Jennifer Payne, ‘Lifting the 
Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of The Fraud Exception’ [1997] 56 Cambridge Law 
Journal 284; Jason Harris, ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil on The Basis of An Implied Agency: 
A Re-evaluation of Smith, Stone and Knight’ (2005) 23 Company and Securities Law 
Journal 7; John H Farrar, ‘Directors’ Duties and Corporate Governance in Troubled 
Companies’ (2001) 8 Canterbury Law Review 99; Mark Wellard, ‘Lifting the Corporate 
Veil: Personal Liability of Receivers, Administrators and Liquidators’ (2000) 12(10) The 
Australian Insolvency Journal 4; David Parker, ‘Piercing The Veil of Incorporation: 
Company Law for A Modern Era’ (2006) 19(1) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 35;  
Ian M Ramsay and David B Noakes, ‘ Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia’ (2001) 19 
Company and Securities Law Journal 250.                                                                                               
8 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005.
4advancing economy and with the recent reform of the CCL, the question is 
whether its laws have evolved fast enough to address industrial loopholes or 
forge an investor-safe environment. 
This thesis will attempt to analyse the ways in which ‘veil piercing’ doctrine 
protects creditors’ interests in Australia and China. 
A Corporation and Types of Companies
Before this thesis explains the concepts of limited liability and separate legal 
entity status, it is imperative to first define company related terms and the 
different types of company so readers may accurately understand terms used 
in this thesis. It is also important to note that the types of company differ in 
Australia and China and that certain terms such as 'corporation’ are also 
defined differently in both jurisdictions. Thus, the definitions of each type of 
company will be segmented by jurisdiction and this thesis will first discuss 
the definition and types of company in Australia before discussing China. 
1 Australia
Under this segment, the definition of the term ‘corporation’ will be discussed 
followed by an explanation of each type of company under the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
5(a) Definition of Corporation
A ‘corporation’ is often confused with a ‘company’. A corporation is a 
business entity acknowledged by law as a legal person with its own rights and 
liabilities.9 According to section 57A of the Act, a company registered under 
the Act is a type of corporation, thus the definition of the respective terms 
differ. 10 A company is a corporation but a corporation is not always a 
company because a company falls within the ambit of a corporation, which 
also includes any incorporated and unincorporated bodies that may sue or be 
sued or hold property in the name of an office holder appointed for that 
purpose.11
(b) Types of Companies
There are two main types of companies which can be registered in Australia:
proprietary companies and public companies.12 These two types of companies 
are further categorised into four ‘categories’: limited by shares, limited by 
guarantee, unlimited with share capital and no liability. Table A illustrates 
this concept
                                               
9 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9 and 57A.
10 Ibid s 57A. 
11 Ibid s 57.
12 Ibid s 112.
6Table A
Proprietary companies Limited by shares
Unlimited with share capital
Public companies Limited by shares
Limited by guarantee
Unlimited with share capital
No liability company
(i) Proprietary Companies
Proprietary companies are often small or subsidiary companies and are 
generally referred to as ‘private’ companies and are sometimes used as shelf 
companies.13 The definition of proprietary companies is given under section 
45A of the Act; a proprietary company must either be limited by shares or be 
an unlimited company with share capital, it must have no more than 50 non-
employee shareholders, and must not do anything that would require 
disclosure to investors under Chapter 6D. 14
                                               
13 Small proprietary company is one that, for a financial year, satisfies two or more of the 
following criteria: consolidated gross operating revenue for the company and entities it 
controls is less than $25 million, value of consolidated gross assets at the end of the financial 
year of the company and entities it controls is less than $12.5 million, the company and 
entities it controls has fewer than 50 employees at the end of the financial year, Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9 and 45a(2).
Subsidiaries are companies that are controlled by a holding company, Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) s 9; Shelf companies are companies formed but not actually engaged in any business 
activities, Fencott v Muller [1983] HCA 12.
14 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 45A; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 113(1) and 
112(1); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Chapter 6D deals with fundraising (offering of shares 
to public). 
7(ii) Public Companies
There is no express definition of ‘public company’ in the Act. The Act 
merely states that ‘a public company is a company other than proprietary 
company’ and that it is listed on a prescribed financial market such as the 
Australia Securities Exchange Ltd (ASX) or the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE).15
The thesis will only focus on companies limited by shares because these have
both limited liability and separate legal entity status.16 This thesis will not 
analyse companies limited by guarantee because these companies are usually 
non-profit.17 This is in contrast to companies limited by shares, which are 
profit-driven and require directors and shareholders to routinely assess and 
take investment risks.18 These risks, whether taken in good or bad faith, may 
lead to the piercing of the corporate veil, providing ample material for 
discussion on the section in this thesis dealing with breaches of directors’ 
duties.
                                               
15 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 9 and 195 (a)(ii).
16 Ibid s 57A.
17 Lipton, above n 3, 82.
18 Ibid 81.
8(iii) Company Limited by Shares
Companies limited by shares can be public or proprietary companies. 19
Section 9 of the Act defines a company limited by shares as ‘a company 
formed on the principle of having its members liability limited to the amount, 
if any, unpaid on the shares respectively held by them’.20 In other words, 
shareholders’ liabilities are only limited to the nominal value (value of shares 
at the time they are issued to shareholders) of their unpaid shares.21
Since shareholders of a company limited by shares have limited liability, the 
company’s creditors do not have access to the shareholders’ personal wealth 
when recovering their debts in the event of insolvency since shareholders of a 
company limited by shares have limited liability. 22 Therefore, such a 
company is required to include the word ‘limited’ or the word ‘Ltd’ at the end 
of the company’s name. 23 The reason for this is to caution prospective 
creditors that they are only allowed to access to the company’s assets to 
satisfy their debts.24  
This thesis will now shift its focus to China and discuss the term 
‘corporation’ under CCL and the types of companies that can be registered 
under this Act.
                                               
19 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 112.
20 Unpaid shares are share allotments that have not been paid, Kym Anderson, Australia’s 
Economy in Its International Context (University of Adelaide Press, 2009) 100; 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9.
21 Kym Anderson, Australia’s Economy in Its International Context (University of Adelaide 
Press, 2009) 100.
22 Lipton, above n 3, 81.
23 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 148(2).
24 Ibid.
92 China
(a) Definition of Company
In CCL, there is no reference to the term ‘corporation’. The revised statute, 
CCL, only refers to the term ‘company’.25 According to Article 2 of the CCL, 
‘company’ is referred to a limited liability company or joint stock company 
(public limited company). 26 Similar to Australia, a company in China is 
recognised by law as a legal person, owns its own property and has the rights 
to enjoy its own property as a legal person and be liable for debts.27 In 
addition, shareholders have the privilege of the limited liability principle once 
they contribute their subscribe capital into the company.28 This means that the 
separate legal entity status and limited liability principle exist upon 
incorporation of the company under the CCL.29
(b) Types of Companies
There are three types of companies that can be registered under the CCL. The 
author will describe each type of company, which are limited liability 
company, joint-stock company and state-owned enterprise. 
                                               
25 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 2.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid art 3.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
10
(i) Limited Liability Company  
There is no express definition of a limited liability company (‘LLC’) in 
China. The CCL only provides that LLC has the characteristics of limited 
liability and separate legal entity status principles. 30
LLC in China are usually middle or small sized enterprises and include single 
shareholder LLCs.31 The primary difference between a normal LLC (a two or 
more shareholders LLC) and a sole shareholder LLC is the minimum capital 
contribution.32 For a two or more shareholders LLC, the minimum capital 
contribution is RMB 30,000, whereas the minimum capital contribution of a 
sole LLC shareholder is RMB 100,000.33 There is a higher minimum capital 
level imposed on sole shareholder LLC to prevent any abuse of corporate 
structure in a sole shareholder LLC.34 This restriction is an attempt to balance 
the benefits of the limited liability principle to potential investors while still 
protecting creditors.35
                                               
30 Jiang Qing Yun and Wu Jin-Yu, ‘An Economic and Comparative Analysis on Corporate 
Governance in the New Chinese Corporate Law (Research Paper No. 3, Italian Society of 
Law and Economics, 2008).
31 Ibid.
32 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 26 and 59.
33 Ibid.
34 Shuangge Wen, ‘The Ideals and Reality of a Legal Transplant – The Veil-Piercing 
Doctrine in China’ (2014) 50(2) Stanford Journal of International Law 319, 328.
35 Yun, above n 30.
11
(ii) Joint Stock Company
A Joint Stock Company (‘JSC’) is also known as a company limited by 
shares. 36 The company’s total capital is divided into equal shares and 
shareholders take the shares issued to them and are only be liable to the 
extent of shares subscribed respectively by them.37
Where a JSC in Australia can be a public or private company, a JSC can only 
be a public company in China.38 It is established primarily in order to be 
listed on Chinese or foreign stock markets.39 In order to be registered as a 
JSC in China, a minimum of 20% of the capital to be invested by 
shareholders or a minimum of 25% from foreign investors and a minimum 
capital requirement of RMB 5 million is required for investment.40 A large 
number of these companies are set up to attract foreign investment.41
Although JSC and LLC seem to be similar, there are a number of differences 
between them. The difference between JSC and LLC is the restriction on the 
amount of shareholders. LLC’s shareholders are limited to 50, whereas JSC 
                                               
36 Minkang Gu, Understanding Chinese Company Law (Hong Kong University Press, 2010) 
115.
37 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 3 and 9.
38 Ibid art 86.
39Ibid art 78.
40 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 81; [Provisional Regulations on the Establishment 
of Foreign-Funded Joint Stock Companies Limited] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 10 January 1995, art 2.
41 Jiangyu Wang, Company Law in China: Business Organizations in a Socialist Market 
Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 55. 
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does not have any limit on the number of shareholders in their company.42 In 
addition, laws are more stringent on JSC as compared to LLC. For example, 
the minimum registered capital of an LLC is RMB 30,000, while a JSC’s 
minimum registered capital is RMB 5 million.43 Thirdly, as mentioned above, 
JSC’s total capital is divided equally to be issued whereas LLC does not 
divide them and issue them. Instead, LLC’s shareholders agree on the equity 
in percentage holding.44 Lastly, a JSC can list their shares on the securities 
exchange market whereas for a LLC to do so, they require approval from 
shareholders.45
(iii) Wholly State-Owned Limited Liability Enterprises as Companies (State-
Owned Enterprises)
A state-owned enterprise (SOE) is wholly or mainly owned by central, 
provincial or city governments. SOEs used to be the backbone of China’s 
economy, exporting 90% of its output and employing the majority of its 
workforce in 1980s. 46 Since reforms in 1980s, the private sector has 
overtaken the importance of SOEs. In 2003, SOEs contributed less than a 
third of the total economic output.47
                                               
42 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 24.
43 Ibid arts 26, 81.
44 Wang, above n 41, 25.
45 Wang, above n 41, 56.
46 Xiaozu Wang, ‘State-Owned Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance’ (Research 
Paper, 2003, Fudan University) 1.
47 Ibid.
13
Before the 1980s reforms, the Chinese government directly controlled SOEs. 
They decided on the materials used, amount of output and labour force. 
Managers and supervisors of SOEs do not have control over the governance 
of the company.48 The reforms introduced the concept of separate legal entity
status and legal person status to SOEs, which were then allowed to exercise 
their functions and powers in accordance with CCL. 49 SOEs’ boards of 
directors are allowed to exercise their functions and powers in accordance 
with CCL.50
CCL defines SOE as ‘a limited liability company wholly funded by State’ in 
which the central or local authority in charge of the administration of state 
assets is authorised to serve as the investor/shareholder.51 The State is the 
only shareholder of its company and is represented by the central State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and 
provincial SASACs.52 The CCL recognises that the State does not have to 
bear unlimited liability unless its directors or managers abuse the 
management of the company. 53
This thesis will analyse LLC, JSC and SOE when discussing China’s laws on 
director duties and ‘veil-piercing’ doctrines.
                                               
48 Wang, above n 46, 2.
49 Geng Xiao, ‘ Reforming The Governance Structure of China’s State-Owned Enterprises’ 
(1998) 18 Public Administration and Development 273, 275.
50 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 47 and 67.
51 Wang, above n 41, 56.
52 Ibid 55.
53 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 65.
14
This Chapter will now analyse the principle of limited liability, followed by 
the principle of ‘separate legal entity’ status. The CCL is modelled on the 
common law doctrine of limited liability and separate legal entity status.54
Thus, the author will provide the history and definition of limited liability and 
separate legal entity status following the UK and Australian experience.
B Limited Liability
This segment will first explain the definition of ‘limited liability’ and will 
provide a brief history of how this principle became to play a principal role in 
setting up a company. It will also discuss the benefits of limited liability as a 
principal characteristic of a company.  This segment is important as it 
accentuates the importance of limited liability acting as a shield for directors 
and shareholders.  
1 Definition
The principle of limited liability means that the shareholders are not 
personally liable for the company’s debts and are only limited to the amount 
of capital they invested.55
                                               
54 Wen above n 34, 321.
55 Ian M Ramsay and David B Noakes, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia’ (2001) 19 
Company and Securities Law Journal 250, 251; Colin Mackie, ‘From Privilege to Right –
Themes in the Emergence of Limited Liability’ (2011) 4 Judicial Review 293.
15
2 Brief History
The adoption of the concept of limited liability in Australia can be traced 
back to the UK. 56 Limited liability was first introduced by the Limited 
Liability Act 1855 (UK).57 That Act provided that the liability of shareholders 
would not be beyond the amount invested. For example, if the shareholder 
bought $200 worth of shares, the maximum amount risked was $200.58
Before the introduction of limited liability, the Act, United Kingdom Joint 
Stock Companies Act 1844 (UK) only allowed company registration and there 
was no mention of the concept of ‘limited liability’. 59 This Act enabled 
companies to be incorporated by a process of registration, and it established 
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies to register companies. This Act applied to 
all joint stock companies with more than 25 members or companies, which 
permitted transfer of shares without consent of all the members.60
Although there was a procedure for proper registration of companies, the 
concept of limited liability was still unavailable. Shareholders could still be 
personally liable for the company’s debts and this discouraged many wealthy 
                                               
56 Philip Lipton, Abe Herzberg and Michelle Welsh, Understanding Company Law 
(Thomson Reuters, 17th ed, 2014) 5; R Tomasic, ‘The Modernization of Corporations Law: 
Corporate Law Reform in Australia and Beyond’ (2006) 19(1) Australian Journal of 
Corporate Law 2; Phillip Lipton, ‘A History of Company Law in Colonial Australia: Legal 
Evolution and Economic Development’ (Working Paper No 10, Monash University 
Department of Business Law & Taxation -Corporate Law and Accountability Research 
Group, 2007).
57 Muhammad Khalid Malik, International Aspects of Corporate Law and Governance
(Master Thesis, The University of Warwick, 2005-2006) 2.
58 Ibid.
59 United Kingdom Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (UK).
60 William J Carney, ‘Limited Liability’ (Research Paper, Emory University School of Law, 
13 January 1998).
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investors from investing in the UK.61 The pressure from investors seeking a 
safer investment led to enactment of the Limited Liability Act 1885 (UK), 
which granted companies limited liability for investors.62
Since then, the principle of limited liability became firmly established by 
Salomon’s case, which was subsequently applied and affirmed in later 
cases.63
3 Benefits of Limited Liability
This segment will discuss the benefits of limited liability to accentuate the 
importance of limited liability as a principal characteristic of a company.
Firstly, limited liability translates into a potentially win-win scenario for 
shareholders and directors.64 The limited liability shield protects directors, 
being controllers of a company. This means that directors will not be 
personally liable for the company’s debts unless they breach their duties or 
deliberately incur debt of the company when it is insolvent.65 As such, this 
shield emboldens directors to take higher risks for the company so long as 
                                               
61 Malik, above n 57.
62 Carney, above n 60.
63 Fish and Packer v Stanton [1910] HCA 70; Casuarina Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (19070) 44 AJLR 299; Nicholson v Permakraft (NZ) Ltd (in liq) [1985] 1 NZLR 
242; Bank of New Zealand v Fiberi Pty Ltd (1992) 8 ASCR 790; Director of Public 
Prosecution v Gomez [1993] AC 442; Rushton (Qld) Pty Ltd v Rushton (NSW) Pty Ltd
[2004] QSC 047; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu v JP Morgan Portfolio Services Ltd [2007] 
FMCA 477; Palermo v Palermo (No 2) [2014] WASC 6; William J Carney, ‘Limited 
Liability’ (Research Paper, Emory University School of Law, 13 January 1998). 
64 Lipton, above n 3, 30.
65 Ibid.
17
these decisions are taken in the best interests of the company.66 These high 
risks may also result in high rewards, thereby resulting in a potentially 
advantageous scenario for shareholders.67
Secondly, limited liability transfers risk from shareholders to creditors.68 If 
the company profits, the profit will be distributed to the shareholders; 
however, if the company suffers from any losses, creditors will bear the 
consequences.69 Thus, shareholders only lose the amount of shares invested 
in the company, whereas creditors could lose anything up to the entire value 
of their investment in, or product or service provided to, the company if the 
company is unable to repay debts to creditors.70
Thirdly, limited liability allows the separation of ownership and management 
of a company. 71 Shareholders and directors play different roles in the 
operations of the company.72 Directors act as an agent for the shareholders to 
govern the company’s day-to-day operation and they have fiduciary duties to 
act in the best interests of the company.73 Directors have better knowledge of 
the market economy and they are more specialised in making an optimal 
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Limits Liability’ (2007) 56(5) Emory Law Journal 1309, 1312.
71 Lipton, above n 3, 30.
72 Ibid.
73 Ian M Ramsay and David B Noakes, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia’ (2001) 19 
Company and Securities Law Journal 250, 255.
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decision for the company.74 This reduces the need for shareholders to monitor 
the managers of companies.75 Furthermore, the risk to the shareholders of a 
company’s failure is only limited to the loss of capital invested. Unlike in an 
unlimited liability company, where shareholders’ personal wealth is at stake, 
shareholders of limited liability companies do not tend to intrude into the 
day-to-day management of the company.76
These are the benefits of the principle of limited liability. This principle in 
which the controllers of the company are only limited to the amount invested 
flows from the concept of the company being a ‘separate legal entity’, the 
next concept that will be discussed.77 This is because the owners are not 
liable for their company’s debts since a shareholder and the company are two 
distinct legal persons.78  Hence, limited liability and separate legal entity
status principles complement each other. 
C Separate Legal Entity Status
This segment will define the principle of ‘separate legal entity’ status and 
discuss the landmark case, Salomon’s case,79 which established the principle 
of ‘separate legal entity’ status. It is important to define this principle because 
it is one of the defining characteristics of a company. 
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1 Definition
The principle of separate legal entity status establishes that a company is 
distinguishable from its directors and shareholders. 80   This means that a 
company can enter into a contract by itself and have its own rights and 
liabilities.81 A company’s property is also separate from that of its directors 
and shareholders.82 The principle of separate legal entity status automatically 
comes into effect once a company is registered. 83 The landmark case, 
Salomon’s84 is authority for the legal principle that an incorporated company 
is a separate legal entity from its shareholders, founder and directors.85
2 Salomon’s case
Mr Salomon was a boot and shoe manufacturer and he sold his shoe business 
to a limited liability company, which he had set up with his sons. The 
shareholders of the company were Mr Salomon, Mrs S and their five children 
and each of them took one share. Mr Salomon and his two eldest sons were 
appointed directors. The consideration for the sale of the business was 
£39,000 which was an excessive price. The purchase price was paid as 
follows: 20,000 x £1 fully paid up shares, debentures worth £10,000 issued to 
                                               
80 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 124; Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1987] AC 22; 
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Salomon (the debentures being a secured charge over the company’s assets), 
£1000 paid in cash to Salomon an £8000 payment in discharge of the debts of 
the business.86
Business went into decline and Salomon injected more funds, which were 
apparently insufficient to stabilize the company. He then borrowed £5000 
from Edmund Broderip by reissuing the debentures in Broderip’s name. 
However, the business deteriorated further and eventually the company went 
into liquidation.  The liquidator found that the company’s assets were worth 
only £6000. £5000 was used to repay Broderip’s claim, and the remaining 
£1000 was repaid to Salomon, the debenture holder, because the debentures 
were a secured charge over the company’s assets. After these repayments, 
there would be nothing left to repay of the £8000 owed to the unsecured 
creditors. 
The liquidator attempted to hold Mr Salomon personally liable as a director 
for the debts of the company. The liquidator argued that the debentures used 
by Mr Salomon as a security for the debt were invalid, and that Salomon had 
committed fraud by deceiving the unsecured creditors with the excessive 
price of the business. Williams J in the High Court, Vaughan J and the other 
judges in Court of Appeal ruled against Mr Salomon on the grounds that the 
company was Mr Salomon’s agent to commit fraud and Mr Salomon as a 
principal was liable for debts to unsecured directors.87
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The House of Lords unanimously overturned the decision and held that:
A company is not, per se, the agent of its shareholders, even if control is 
concentrated in only one shareholder. The mere fact that a person owns all 
the shares in a company does not make the business carried on by that 
company his business. Once the company is legally incorporated, it must 
be treated like any other independent person with rights and liabilities of 
its own.88
In other words, the House of Lords affirmed the legal principle that, upon 
incorporation, a company is considered as a new legal entity, separate from 
its shareholders. The company has its own right and liabilities. Therefore, Mr 
Salomon was not liable for the company’s debts.89
3 Post-Salomon’s case 
The Salomon’s case established the foundation rule that a company is 
recognised by law as a legal person with its own rights and liabilities, and not 
merely an agent of its owners.90
Secondly, it established the doctrine that the shareholders are not liable for 
the company’s debts beyond their initial capital investment, and have no 
proprietary interest in the company’s properties.91
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The Salomon’s principle was affirmed in The King v Portus,92 where Latham 
CJ ruled that the company is a distinct person from its shareholders and the 
directors who are not personally liable to the creditors for the company’s 
debts.
This principle is firmly established in the Australian and the Chinese 
statute. 93 Companies that are formed under the Act and CCL are 
automatically considered a separate legal entity from its directors and 
shareholders.
Nevertheless, some directors abuse the principles of separate legal entity and 
limited liability and in such cases, courts are allowed to pierce the corporate 
veil and hold them liable for the company’s debts.94 The circumstances that 
will allow courts to pierce the corporate veil will be discussed in Chapter II –
Directors’ Duties (Insolvent Trading) and Chapter III – Piercing the corporate 
veil. 
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The next segment will provide a brief history and description of piercing the 
corporate veil to demonstrate an overview and the reason behind the 
introduction of veil piercing doctrine.
D Piercing the Corporate Veil
1 Definition
Piercing the corporate veil is when a court decides to depart from the 
principles of separate legal entity status and limited liability to hold directors 
and shareholders liable for the company’s debts.95
2 Brief History
The principle of piercing the corporate veil can be traced back to Germany in 
the 1920s. German corporate law developed a number of theories in the early 
1920s for lifting the corporate veil.96 As this thesis focuses on current aspects 
of corporate law, this thesis will only provide a brief history of piercing the 
corporate law starting with the history of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ shortly 
after, the landmark case, Salomon’s in the UK.
After the establishment of the limited liability and separate legal entity status
principles in Salomon’s case, UK courts affirmed that they would not allow 
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the abuse of the principles established in Salomon’s case.97 They would not 
allow the separate identity of a company to be used to avoid any pre-existing 
liability or for fraud purposes.98 This was affirmed through a series of cases 
beginning from 1960s.99
Jones v Lipman100 is an example in which the corporate veil is lifted when a 
company is used as a ‘mere façade’ to avoid a pre-existing obligation. In this 
case, Lipman breached his contract by failing to sell a property to Jones. 
Subsequently, Lipman transferred the property to a company, of which he 
and a nominee were the sole shareholders and directors. The court held that 
the company that Lipman transferred his property to was a sham and was 
used to avoid the consequences of his breach of contract. Lipman was held 
liable and specific performance was ordered against him to perform the 
contract. Lipman’s company was not considered as a separate legal entity 
because Lipman’s real purpose of forming the company was to avoid his 
personal contractual obligation and not for the real purpose of carrying on 
business. 
                                               
97 Thomas K Cheng, ‘The Corporate Veil Doctrine Revisited: A Comparative Study of 
English and the US Corporate Veil Doctrines’ (2011) 34(2) Boston College International 
and Comparative Law Review 329, 338; Charles Pugh, United Kingom: Piercing the 
Corporate Veil – Recent Development (10 April 2012) Mondaq < 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/171488/Directors+ 
Officers+Executives+Shareholders/Piercing+The+Corporate+Veil+Recent+Developments>; 
See also Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832; Littlewoods Mail Order Stores v Inland 
Revenue Commissioners [1969] 1 WLR 1241; DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets 
London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852.
98 Cheng, above n 94, 328.
99 Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832; Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] 
UKHL 5; Adams v Cape Industries plc [1990] 1 Ch 433; Re Polly Peck International plc (in 
administration) [1996] 2 All ER 433; Benefit Strategies group Inc v Pride [2004] SASC 365; 
James Sleightholme, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in Claims Enforcement’ (Speech delivered 
at Elborne Mitchel LL Lecture, Llyod’s Old Library, 22 August 2012) < 
http://www.elbornes.com/downloads/Lecture_Notes_-
_Piercing_the_Corporate_Veil_in_Claims_Enforcement.pdf>.
100 Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832.
25
In the 1970s, the elements of piercing of the corporate veil expanded to 
include parent companies and subsidiaries. In DHN Food Distributors v 
Tower Hamlets LBC101 and Woolfson v Stratchlyde Regional Council102, the 
courts again emphasized that it is only appropriate to pierce the corporate veil 
where circumstances indicate that it is a mere façade concealing true facts.103
The next case discussed, Adams v Cape Industries,104 is a leading case in the 
veil-piercing doctrine because it expands on the grounds that courts can 
pierce the corporate veil.
Adams v Cape Industries,105 in 1990 affirmed the important elements of veil-
piercing doctrine.106 This leading case in the UK is authority for the factors 
that can be taken into in piercing the corporate veil: which are discussed 
below.107 The Court of Appeal asserted that courts are not free to disregard 
the principles of separate legal entity status and limited liability just because 
it considers justice requires it.108 The decision in Adams v Cape109 is crucial 
to the understanding of lifting the corporate veil because the Court of Appeal 
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discussed three circumstances for piercing the veil: single economic unit, 
agency and façade.110
This case involved liability within a group of companies. Cape Industries 
Public Limited Company was a parent company of an international group that 
mined asbestos in South Africa and were shipped to Texas, where Cape’s 
subsidiary, NAAC, supplied the asbestos to another company in Texas. 
NAAC’s employees fell ill, with asbestosis. The claimant, one of the 
employees, Adams, sought to circumvent the separate legal status within a 
parent company (Cape) and its subsidiary company (NAAC) to hold the 
parent company liable for NAAC’s responsibilities. 
The court had to determine whether the defendant had a presence in the 
United States (‘US’) and whether a Texan judgment could be enforced 
against the entity. The court could not disregard the principles established in 
Salomon’s in the name of justice and rejected the argument that Cape and 
NAAC should be treated as one entity. 111 In addition, the Court of Appeal 
stated the circumstances that a veil may be pierced: single economic unit, 
agency and façade. 112 These circumstances will be further discussed in 
Chapter III – Piercing the Corporate Veil since the circumstances will be 
compared to another jurisdiction, China.
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E Lifting or Piercing?
This section lays down the reason the author chose the term ‘piercing’ instead 
of ‘lifting’ the corporate veil for this thesis. 
Australian courts have often mixed the terminology regarding the court’s act 
of ‘going behind’ the corporate veil to hold directors personally liable,113 or 
more specifically, ‘piercing’ or ‘lifting’ the corporate veil. 
The English courts expressly distinguish the meaning of ‘piercing the 
corporate veil’ from ‘lifting the corporate veil’. Staughton LJ, in Atlas 
Maritime Co SA v Avalon Maritime Ltd (No 1)114 stated:
To pierce the corporate veil is an expression that I would reserve for 
treating the rights and liabilities or activities of a company as the 
right or liabilities or activities of its shareholders. To lift the 
corporate veil or look behind it, on the other hand, should mean to 
have regard to the shareholding in a company for some legal 
purpose.115
The distinction between these two phrases is not strictly followed in 
Australia, where these two phrases are often mixed up in the courts.116 Young
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J, in Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd, 117 defined the 
expression “lifting the corporate veil” as ‘that although whenever each 
individual company is formed a separate legal personality is created, courts 
will on occasions, look behind the legal personality to the real controllers’.118
In other words, Young J suggested that courts might refer to “lifting” the 
corporate veil at anytime they want to examine the operating mechanism 
behind a company.119 ‘Piercing’ the corporate veil is used to hold a person 
liable for company’s debts or liabilities.120
This thesis examines veil-piercing doctrine that acts as a mechanism for 
creditors to pursue any corporate abuse by directors or shareholders. 
Therefore, the phrase ‘piercing the corporate veil’ has more effect in 
conveying this thesis’ aim in analysing laws on veil-piercing doctrine, which 
allow courts to hold shareholders or directors personally liable.
F Summary of Chapter I – Introduction
This Chapter has explained the objective of this thesis which is to determine 
which jurisdiction, Australia or China, has better veil piercing laws that 
protects creditors’ interest. The discussion of veil piercing laws in Australia 
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and China will be in Chapter II – Directors’ Duties (Insolvent Trading) and 
Chapter III – Piercing the Corporate Veil.
This Chapter also defined the meaning of ‘corporation’ and ‘company’ under 
the Act and CCL. There is also an explanation of types of limited liability 
companies that are allowed to be incorporated under the Act and CCL. The 
explanation illustrates the types of companies that are considered limited 
liability under the Act and CCL and it is important to highlight that the types 
of companies in Australia and China are distinct from one another and also 
differ in characteristics.
Further, this Chapter has laid the foundation of the basic principles of a 
company, namely the principles of limited liability and separate legal entity
status, by providing the relevant definitions, history and also illustrating the 
landmark case, Salomon’s case, which is associated with these principles. It is 
essential to lay down the foundation of these principles as piercing the 
corporate veil doctrine is linked to them.
Furthermore, this chapter has also explained the reason courts are allowed to 
pierce the corporate veil by briefly explaining its history and some of the 
cases that help to affirm veil-piercing doctrine. This segment was included in 
this Chapter to demonstrate an overview of the veil piercing doctrine.
The next Chapter, Directors’ Duties: Creditors’ Interest (Insolvent Trading) 
will focus on directors’ duties in relation to creditors’ interests in both 
jurisdictions and the implications for the veil piercing doctrine. It also 
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includes a comparison between both jurisdictions regarding insolvent trading 
and directors’ duties.
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II DIRECTORS’ DUTIES (INSOLVENT TRADING)
A Introduction
This Chapter will discuss a director’s duties in relation to creditors’ interests 
in Australia and China. The focus of this Chapter will be a director’s duty to 
prevent insolvent trading since a breach of this duty will often affect 
creditors’ interests and a discussion on the duty is vital since a breach of this 
duty will usually allow the court to pierce the corporate veil.121
This Chapter will first discuss Australia’s directors’ duties relating to the 
laws on insolvent trading. The discussion then shifts to China, which 
examines directors’ duties under the CCL and statutory insolvent trading laws 
under the Chinese Bankruptcy Law (‘CBL’) since the CCL does not provide
any provisions regarding insolvent trading. It is essential to first discuss 
directors’ duties because they underpin the basic responsibility of a director 
in a company, which are related to a director’s duty to prevent insolvent 
trading. Therefore, the director’s fiduciary duties that will be discussed are 
the ‘duty to act in good faith and in the company’s best interests’
This Chapter will also examine the insolvent trading laws of the US because 
China has insufficient primary and secondary sources discussing insolvent 
trading laws.122 The US is a suitable replacement in lieu of China because the 
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CBL, as will be shown, is modelled on the US common law regarding a 
director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading.123
After examining the directors’ duties regarding insolvent trading laws, there 
will be two comparisons - Australia with China and Australia with the US.  
The comparisons are made to analyse which jurisdiction provides better 
creditor protection in relation to insolvent trading and it will be argued that 
Australia has better insolvent trading laws than China and the US in this 
respect.
The next segment will examine directors’ duties in Australia regarding 
insolvent trading in Australia.
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B Directors’ Duties in Australia
This segment will concentrate on Australian directors’ duty to prevent 
insolvent trading. Directors have a duty to prevent the company from trading 
while insolvent. If a director breaches this duty, the company’s creditors may 
sue him or her and the courts may hold him or her personally liable.124
This segment first examines a director’s fiduciary duties before extending 
into a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading. It is important to first 
examine a director’s fiduciary duties because it forms the underlying 
commitment that a director owes to a company, and they extend to the duty to 
prevent insolvent trading.
1 Fiduciary Duties
Directors’ duties are governed by the Act and case law.125 Directors owe 
fiduciary duties to their companies, which have developed through case law 
and are reinforced by legislation.126 A fiduciary duty in this context is an
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equitable duty to act in good faith for the benefit of another.127 Directors are 
not permitted to profit from their position or to put themselves in a position 
where their fiduciary duties and their personal interests may conflict.128
This includes a duty of loyalty.129 In Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mothew, Millett LJ explained the concept of ‘loyalty’:
The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. 
The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This 
core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he must 
not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position 
where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own 
benefit or for the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of 
his principal…130
Thus, the Court has expressly laid down four main principles of fiduciary 
duties. The four main principles of fiduciary duties are firstly, to act in good 
faith and in the best interests of the company, secondly, to exercise directors’ 
powers for proper purposes, thirdly, to retain their discretionary powers and 
lastly, to avoid any undisclosed conflicts of interests.131 These common law 
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duties are supplemented by statutory duties.132 This segment will focus on the 
‘duty to act in good faith and in the company’s best interests’ as this duty 
encompasses a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading.133
The following segments will first discuss a director’s duty of act in good faith 
and in the company’s best interests.
(a) Good Faith and in the Company’s Best Interests
As mentioned above, directors have a fiduciary and statutory duty to act in 
good faith and in the best interests of the company.134 The test as to whether a 
director has acted in good faith and in the company’s best interests is an 
objective test.135
This test is a ‘reasonable person test’ and it requires an honest person in the 
position of a director to have reasonably believed that his or her conduct was 
in the best interests of the company.136 Owen J in Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v 
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Westpac Banking Corp (No 9)137 noted that a director’s management decision 
is not reasonable:
if, on consideration of the surrounding circumstances, the assertion of 
directors that their conduct was bona fide in the best interests of the 
company and for proper purposes should be doubted, discounted or not 
accepted’.138 This has been affirmed on appeal in Westpac Banking Corp v 
Bell Group Ltd (No 3).139
The issue remains as to the actual meaning of ‘best interests of the company’. 
Courts take the fundamental view that the duty to act in good faith and in the 
best interests of the company also includes the interests of shareholders as a 
whole unit.140
However, the definition of ‘best interests of the company’ is ‘ever-
changing’. 141 When a company is solvent, a director is required to have 
regard to the interests of the shareholders as well as to the interests of the 
company as a commercial entity.142 When a company is insolvent or going 
into insolvency, a director is required to consider the company’s present and 
future creditors’ interests.143
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In Nicholson v Permakrat (NZ) Ltd (in liq), Cooke J noted that a director may 
be required to consider the interests of the company’s existing creditors if he
or she knew ought to have known that a payment made by the company is 
likely to jeopardise the company’s solvency.144 His Honour suggested that it 
was possible that creditors might have an action against directors for a breach 
of duty of care or negligence in appropriate circumstances.145
This fiduciary duty is crucial to a to prevent insolvent trading as it obligates a 
director to consider creditors’ interests at certain points in time (when a 
company is insolvent or near insolvency). Thus, it protects creditors’ 
interests. A director will be personally liable for the creditors’ injury if he or 
she disregards creditors’ interests at or near insolvency.146
Now that it has been established that the law places a duty upon directors to 
prevent insolvent trading, this next segment will discuss about the nature and 
scope of that duty.
2 Directors’ Duty to Prevent Insolvent Trading
This segment will explain insolvent trading and describe the circumstances in 
which a director must prevent insolvent trading. There will also be a 
discussion on the consequences if this duty if breached, however only 
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compensation orders will be discussed as these are the consequences most 
directly related to creditors’ interests.
A company is insolvent when it is unable to pay all its debts as and when 
debts become due and payable.147 When a company is insolvent, a director is 
required to place the creditors’ interests above the shareholders’. 148 For 
example, a director has to pay off the company’s debts before distributing 
any payments to its shareholders.149 A director is also not allowed to transfer 
the company’s property or dispose of its assets for less than commercial value 
because such actions will decrease the size of the pool of assets that are 
available to pay the company’s outstanding debts and will prejudice the 
interests of the company’s creditors. 150 Thus, directors are subjected to the 
fiduciary duty not to engage in activities that will prejudice creditors’ 
interests when a company is in financial difficulties.151
Insolvent trading occurs when a director incurs debt at a time when the 
company is insolvent (or pushed by the debt into insolvency),152 when there 
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are reasonable grounds for suspecting insolvency.153 Directors are under a 
statutory duty to prevent insolvent trading.154
Section 588G of the Act imposes a statutory obligation on directors to 
prevent insolvent trading as directors control the overall management of the 
company and have the power to prevent debts from being incurred.155
Olsson J in Powell v Fryer also noted that to declare a company insolvent 
must also be based on its financial circumstances.156 His Honour stated:
The conclusion of insolvency must be derived from a proper consideration 
of the Company’s financial position, in its entirety, based on commercial 
reality. Generally speaking, it ought not to be drawn simply from evidence 
of a temporary lack of liquidity. Regard should be had not only to the 
Company’s cash resources immediately available, but also to money, 
which it can procure by realization by sale, or borrowing against the 
security of its assets, or otherwise reasonably raise from those associated 
with, or supportive of, it. It is the inability, utilizing such resources as are 
available through the use of assets or which may otherwise realistically be 
raised through the use of assets or which may otherwise realistically be 
raised to meet debts as they fall due which indicates insolvency.157
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Thus, insolvency is determined by a company’s circumstances as well as its 
inability to pay its debts.158
Directors breach section 588G of the Act if they fail to prevent the company 
from incurring debt when they have a reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
company was insolvent at the time the debt was incurred. 159 The term 
‘reasonable’ in this context was defined in ASIC v Plymin,160 where a director 
of reasonable competence and diligence is expected to be capable of reaching
a reasonably informed opinion as to the company’s financial capacity.161
Chesterman J in Williams v Scholz identified some of the circumstances in 
which a director can reasonably suspect a company is insolvent.162 Some 
examples include trading unprofitably and accumulating losses continuously 
or when the company’s overdraft facility is frequently exceeded.163  
Once the directors have reasonable grounds to suspect insolvency, they have 
a duty to prevent the company from incurring debt.164 Failure to do so is a 
breach of section 588G(2) of the Act. Justice Mandie in ASIC v Plymin
(‘Water Wheel case’) case noted: 165
A non-executive director is expected to take steps to put himself in a 
position to monitor the company and to exercise and form an independent 
judgment and to take a diligent and intelligent interest in the information 
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either available to him or which he might with fairness demand from the 
executives or other employees and agents of the company.166
The Court held that if the director was aware of facts which would cause a 
reasonably competent non-executive director to suspect that the company was 
insolvent at the time it incurred a debt, section 588G(2) will be breached167
A breach by a director of section 588G may also be a breach of section 181 of 
the Act (duty of good faith and to act in the best interests of the company) 
because a director has arguably not acted in the best interests of the 
company.168 A director in this instance knowingly allows the company to end 
up in a poor state, saddled with debt or insolvent and has also arguably not 
regarded the creditors’ interests because the ability of the company to repay 
its debts has been reduced.169
(a) Consequences of Contravention
This segment will discuss the consequences which a director may face if he 
or she breaches section 588G of the Act. There are several consequences: the 
court may order a director to pay compensation or disqualify the director 
from managing companies or impose a criminal penalty (punishable by fine 
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or imprisonment) or other civil penalty orders.170 This segment will only 
focus on the compensation orders as the thesis’ main focus is on creditors and 
the director being personally liable to the company’s creditors.
A compensation order is a civil penalty to compensate the creditors for 
damages caused by a director’s breach. 171 Compensation orders under 
sections 588J or 588K may be made whether or not the company is in 
liquidation. 172 Unsecured creditors can make a claim against a director 
through the liquidators.173 In circumstances where liquidators fail to launch 
an action or a liquidator consents to the creditor’s application to launch an 
action, creditors are given a right to initiate their own compensation claims 
against a director.174
Under sections 588J, 588K and 588M of the Act, a director is liable to pay 
compensation equal to the amount of loss or damage suffered by all 
unsecured creditors whose debts were incurred in contravention of section 
588G due to the company’s insolvency.175 Secured creditors may also claim 
compensation from a director if they are able to prove that the unsecured 
debts were incurred when the company was insolvent.176
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Secured creditors can only recover their debts from a company that was 
trading while insolvent once all the company’s unsecured debts have been 
paid in full. This is because insolvent trading has a bigger impact on 
unsecured creditors since they do not have any secured interests over any of 
the company’s assets and the debts were incurred when the director knew the 
company was insolvent.177
In conclusion, directors in Australia have a fiduciary duty regarding insolvent 
trading and if they incur debts when a company is insolvent or near 
insolvency, they will be not be able to hide behind the corporate veil and will 
be personally liable to compensate creditors.178 Thus, the laws are clear on a 
director’s duty regarding insolvent trading and arguably provide a fairly high 
degree of protection for creditors.179
The discussion now shifts to China, where a director’s’ duties will be 
examined.
C Directors’ Duties in China
This segment focuses on a Chinese director’s duty to prevent the company 
from bankruptcy because a violation of these duties may result in the director 
being personally liable to the creditors.180 In China, the term ‘bankruptcy’ in 
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the context of companies means being insolvent.181 This segment will first 
discuss a director’s duties in China which are the ‘duty of loyalty’ and the
‘duty of care’ followed by a director’s duty to prevent the company from 
bankruptcy.
Unlike in Australia, China’s directors’ duties are fully codified in the CCL.182
However, the CCL does not explain the meaning of these duties. 183 The 
concepts of ‘duty of loyalty’ and ‘duty of care’ in China are based on a 
principal-agent relationship where agents are loyal to their principal and have 
duties to exercise their powers in good faith and good care.184 In order to 
grasp the definition of these concepts, one must look to secondary sources.185
Directors in China are thus effectively agents and are required to actively 
discharge their duties of good faith and care and to place their company’s 
(principal’s) interests above their personal interests.186
Best interests of a company in China also include shareholders’ interests.187
The CCL sets out the duties of a director to ensure that they act in the 
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shareholders’ interests.188 However, during bankruptcy, directors are under a 
statutory obligation to not damage creditors’ interests and they must focus on 
the creditors’ interests and fulfil a duty of care when the company is 
bankrupt.189 Similar to Australia, as noted above, a director’s duty to act in 
the best interests of the company in China changes depending on the 
company’s financial status. 190 When a company is solvent, a director’s 
primary interests are the shareholders’ interests but when the company is 
bankrupt, creditors’ interests takes priority over shareholders’ interests.191
The thesis will now further discuss the nature and scope of the duty of care 
and the duty of loyalty which are specifically set out in the CCL.
1 Duty of Loyalty 
CCL does not define the ‘duty of loyalty’.192 Rather, CCL only prohibits a 
director from acts related to bribery, misappropriation of company assets or 
funds, abuse of position and power and breaches of confidentiality. 193
However, this thesis will not discuss each prohibitory act because they are 
not related to the thesis topic.
                                                                                                                                    
State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 7 April 1998, art 59; Micheal J Moser, Fu 
Yu (eds), Doing Business in China (Juris Publishing, 2014) 1526. 
188 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, arts 148, 149, 150, 151, 152 and 153.
189 [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of 
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 54, 1 June 2007, art 125.
190 Micheal J Moser, Fu Yu (eds), Doing Business in China (Juris Publishing, 2014) 1539.
191 Ibid.
192 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, arts 116, 148 and 149.
193 Ibid.
46
The thesis will now discuss a director’s ‘duty of care’. This duty is essential 
because a director must exercise reasonable care to ensure that insolvent 
trading does not occur.
2 Duty of Care 
Article 148 of the CCL does not provide any definitions or guiding principles 
regarding this duty.194 Yousu Zhou, an academic, suggests a definition for 
this duty as follows:
The duty of care, also known as the duty of good management or duty of 
attention, means that the directors, supervisors and senior management 
executives shall exercise the rights granted by the company prudently, 
seriously and diligently, and act with the kind of prudence, care and 
diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would behave like under 
similar circumstances.195
Various leading academics in corporate law have adopted this definition of 
the duty of care.196 Despite this, there is no conclusive or settled definition of 
directors’ duty of care in China.197 Fortunately, there have been some judicial 
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comments regarding the definition of duty of care which may offer at least 
some guidance. Two judges of the Supreme People’s Court (‘SPC’), Judge Xi 
and Judge Jin in their academic writings noted that Chinese courts have 
adopted the ‘three-criteria of the duty of care decided in the case law of 
Anglo-American countries’.198
The first criterion is that a director must act in good faith.199 The test for good 
faith is different from Australia because it is based on a subjective test in 
China whereas Australia applies an objective test as noted above.200 This 
subjective test requires a director to reasonably believe that he or she was 
acting in good faith in the best interests of the company at the time they 
committed the alleged wrongdoing.201 An important factor would be whether 
the director understood the consequences of their actions and had bothered to 
take due care to ensure that negative consequences would not ensue.202 If a 
director understood that his or her actions would be detrimental to the 
company’s interests but did not take positive steps to ensure that the 
detrimental would not occur, this test of good faith will not have been 
satisfied.203 This test requires honest intent; a director cannot be disingenuous 
and say that they believed in a certain state of affairs when privately they 
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knew this was not the case, so are really only looking for a ‘convenient 
excuse’.204
The second criterion is care. 205 Directors must carry out their duty 
commensurate with the standard expected of someone with their professional 
qualifications and experience.206 Thus, while the first criterion involved a 
subjective test, there is an element of objectivity in this criterion in the 
manner in which directors act on such beliefs (which is to act as other 
professionals would).207
The last criterion is reasonable belief.208 Directors need to reasonably believe 
that their actions are in the best interests of the company.209 Therefore, it is 
not enough for directors to have had honest beliefs (the first criterion); such 
beliefs must also have been reasonable, judged by objective standards 
(similar to those outlined in the second criterion).210
If directors are able to satisfy all of the criteria above, they are considered to 
have complied with their obligation of duty of care to the company. This duty 
is essential because a director must exercise reasonable care to ensure that 
insolvent trading does not occur, or that if it does, they are not held 
personally responsible for it. The next segment discusses insolvent trading 
laws in China.
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3 Insolvent Trading in China
The CCL does not deal with insolvent trading and only expresses that 
directors owe a duty to creditors when the company is in liquidation and not 
when it is near bankruptcy.211 As stated above, the CBL governs insolvent 
trading laws in China.212 Thus, this segment’s discussion of insolvent trading 
laws will shift from the CCL to the CBL.
A company is considered bankrupt if it is unable to pay its debts to its 
creditors when they are due and its assets are unable to pay off its debts or 
they are illiquid under Article 2 of CBL.213 Article 125 of the CBL places
several safeguards against insolvent trading by directors.214 Firstly, directors 
who violate the duties of care and who were not honest during trading which 
resulted in the company’s bankruptcy shall be liable for the damage caused to 
the company’s creditors. 215 Secondly, the offending director(s) will not be 
allowed to hold any directorial position for three years. 216
However, the CBL only states that directors are liable for leading the 
company into bankruptcy but is silent as to the circumstances that would 
amount to leading the company into bankruptcy.217 There is also dearth of 
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case and academic discussion on this issue and there are very few cases 
where directors have been held liable.218
Insolvent trading laws in China are governed by the CBL but there is a dearth 
of academic discussion on directors’ duty during insolvency to protect 
creditors’ interests.219 Therefore, for the purpose of analysing which laws 
provide better creditors protection, the author will look to US’s insolvency 
laws since CBL is considered to be modelled on the US’s insolvency laws as 
discussed below.220
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D Insolvent Trading in the United States
As Ferinerman, an academic, has noted, Article 125 of the CBL was adopted 
from the US’s common law model of directors’ duty of good faith (duty to be 
honest) when a company is near bankruptcy.221 It states:
Where a director, supervisor or senior manager going against his 
obligations, fails to be honest and hardworking, which leads to bankruptcy 
of the enterprise where he works, he shall bear civil liability according to 
the law. 222
This provision is based on the US’s deepening insolvency theory whereby a 
director is required to be honest when presenting his or her company’s 
financial records to creditors when the company is near insolvency.223 The 
director is liable if he or she fraudulently prolongs the company’s life by 
misrepresenting the company’s financial situation to creditors in order to 
acquire more funds.224
Since Article 125 is based on the US model, this thesis will look at the US’s
insolvency laws and compare their insolvent trading provisions with 
Australia’s. In the US’s context, the term ‘corporation’ refers to ‘company’.
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In the US, there is no legislation governing liabilities for directors on 
insolvent trading.225 The common law doctrine of ‘deepening insolvency’ in 
the US is used to hold directors liable for improperly prolonging the life of an 
insolvent corporation.226 This doctrine, however, is not applicable to all the 
US’s states.227 The author will focus on the state of Pennsylvania because a 
meta-analysis of all fifty states is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, 
the doctrine of deepening insolvency was first recognised in this state through 
its landmark case, Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v R F Lafferty 
and Co, 267 F 3d 340 (3rd Circuit, 2001) (‘Lafferty’).228
‘Deepening insolvency’ means the fraudulent prolongation of a corporation’s 
life beyond insolvency. In Corporation Aviation Concepts v Multi-Service 
Aviation Corporation, it was stated that: 
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Circuit, 2001); Askanase v Fatjo, 828 F Supp 461 (SD Tex 1993); Official Committee of 
Unsecured Creditors v Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs Inc), 299 BR 732 
(Bankr D Del, 2003); David E Gordon, ‘The Expansion of Deepening Insolvency Standing: 
Beyond Trustees and Creditors’ Committees’ (2005-2006) 22 Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal 221, 228; Richard S Rosenstein, ‘Do No Harm: The Theory of 
Deepening Insolvency’ (Research Paper, Nutter McClennen and Fish LLP, 2011).
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Deepening insolvency occurs where corporate property is injured through 
the fraudulent or concealed expansion of corporate debt and prolongation 
of corporate life… This tort rests upon the theory that a corporation, even 
when insolvent, can have valuable corporate property, the fraudulent 
incurrence of additional debt, however, can damage that value by 
hastening bankruptcy, undermining business relationships, and dissipating 
corporate assets.229
Under the deepening insolvency theory, directors may be held liable if the 
directors and/or officers expand their corporate debt and prolong the life of a 
corporation when the corporation should be declared insolvent.230 This is 
because the continued operation of a corporation has the effect of increasing 
losses and deepening the corporation’s insolvency, thereby further reducing 
the value of the corporate’s assets and injuring the creditors.231
                                               
229 Corporate Aviation Concepts v Multi-Service Aviation Corporation, 2004 WL 1900001 
(ED Pa, 2004).
230 Directors want to prolong the life of a company when it should be declared insolvent 
because the directors believe that the company can continue to operate for another period of 
time, Wiliam L Meyer, ‘Liability of Directors and Officers under the Deepening Insolvency 
Theory’ (Working Paper No 10, Smith, Gambrell and Russell LLP, 2004) 1; Official 
Committee of Unsecured Creditors v R F Lafferty and Co, 267 F 3d 340 (3rd Circuit, 2001); 
Askanase v Fatjo, 828 F Supp 461 (SD Tex 1993); Official Committee of Unsecured 
Creditors v Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs Inc), 299 BR 732 (Bankr D Del, 
2003).
231 William L Meyer, ‘Timing is Everything: Liability of Directors and Officers Under the 
Deepening Insolvency Theory’ (Working Paper No 10, Trust the Leaders, Smith, Gambrell 
and Russell LLP, 2004); David E Gordon, ‘The Expansion of Deepening Insolvency 
Standing: Beyond Trustees and Creditors’ Committees’ (2005-2006) 22 Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal 221.
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If a director borrows additional funds or conceals the corporation’s true 
financial position which deepens the business’ insolvency, he or she may be 
liable for this breach.232
The leading case recognising insolvency as an independent cause of action is 
the Third Circuit’s decision in the abovementioned case of Lafferty.233 In 
Lafferty, there were two lease-financing corporations alleged to have operated 
as a ‘Ponzi scheme’. Both went into insolvency leaving numerous investors 
with significant losses.234 To operate the scheme, the corporations issued 
fraudulent debt certificates which were then sold to individual investors. In 
order to keep the scheme afloat, the management misstated the corporations’ 
financial positions so that they could register, offer and sell additional debt 
certificates to raise capital. The issuance of debt securities deepened the
insolvency of the corporations and put them on the path to insolvency. When 
the corporations lost any reasonable prospect of repaying their outstanding 
debt, they filed for insolvency. The Creditors Committee then brought claims 
against the management (officers and directors) and third party professionals 
                                               
232 David E Gordon, ‘The Expansion of Deepening Insolvency Standing: Beyond Trustees 
and Creditors’ Committees’ (2005-2006) 22 Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 221; 
Jo Ann J Brighton, ‘Deepening Insolvency: Secured Lenders and Bankruptcy Professionals 
Beware: It is Not Just for Officers and Directors Anymore’ (2004) 23(3) American 
Bankruptcy Institute Journal 34.
233 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v R F Lafferty and Co, 267 F 3d 340 (3rd 
Circuit, 2001); David E Gordon, ‘The Expansion of Deepening Insolvency Standing: 
Beyond Trustees and Creditors’ Committees’ (2005-2006) 22 Emory Bankruptcy 
Developments Journal 221,224; Jo Ann J Brighton, ‘Deepening Insolvency: Secured 
Lenders and Bankruptcy Professionals Beware: It is Not Just for Officers and Directors 
Anymore’ (2004) 23(3) American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 34; William L Meyer, 
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234 ‘Ponzi scheme’ is a financial arrangement where the Ponzi operator, without legitimate 
underlying business, makes payments to past investors with funds collected from new 
investors, Kirkland and Ellis LLP, ‘In the Wake of Collapse: Approaches to Ponzi Scheme 
Litigation’ (Working Paper, Kirkland and Ellis LLP, 2009).
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(lawyers, accountants and independent underwriters) who were responsible 
for professional advice which supported the securities’ registration. 
The Supreme Court in Pennsylvania held that deepening insolvency 
constituted a valid cause of action. The Court stated that:
Even when a corporation is insolvent, its corporate property may have 
value. The fraudulent and concealed incurrence of debt can damage that 
value in several ways. For example… the incurrence of debt can force an 
insolvent corporation into bankruptcy…235
The Court also stated that a number of courts have held that deepening 
insolvency may give rise to a perceptible injury to the corporation, which
fraudulently disadvantages creditors. 236  Hence, deepening insolvency is an 
eligible cause of action against directors and third parties.237
                                               
235 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v R F Lafferty and Co, 267 F 3d 340, 349-50 
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237 Official Commissioner of Unsecured Creditors v Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide 
Technologies Inc), 299 B R 732 (Bankr D Del, 2003); Official Commissioner of Unsecured 
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There are several requirements to establish deepening insolvency as a cause 
of action: i) fraud, ii) which prolongs the life of the corporation and iii) which 
causes the expansion of corporate debt. 238
Fraud is an important element to establish deepening insolvency because the 
creditors will be misled by false representations of solvency, and are induced 
into making loans to the insolvent company. 239
The second element is the prolongation of corporate life. 240 Artificial 
prolongation of corporate life occurs when a corporation’s life is prolonged 
when it is supposed to be declared insolvent.241 If the corporate life of a 
company is artificially prolonged after the creditors agreed to provide loans, 
the creditors may be able to sue directors under deepening insolvency.242
The last element is the expansion of corporate debt. 243 There must be 
evidence which demonstrates that the corporation has expanded its corporate 
debt if creditors have agreed to provide loans to the company.244 Plaintiffs 
                                               
238 Official Commissioner of Unsecured Creditors v. Foss (In re Felt Mfg. Co Inc), 371 B R 
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Bankruptcy Law, 2005) 231.
239 In Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the 
Aged), 659 F 3d 282 (3rd Cir, 2011).
240 Ibid. 
241 OHC Liquidation Trust v Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes Corp), 340 B 
R 510, 534-35 (Bankr D Del, 2006).
242 Ibid.
243 Stanziale v Pepper Hamilton LLP (In re Student Finance Corporation), 335 B R 539, 
547-48 (D Del, 2005).
244 Brya M Keilson, ‘Relief in The Boardroom: How the Third Circuit’s CitX Decision 
Weakened Deepening Insolvency as An Independent Cause of Action’ (2007) 52(5) 
Villanova Law Review 975, 982.
57
(creditors) can prove this element by showing to the court, financial report of 
the corporation. 245
However, the element of fraud in deepening insolvency is unclear.246 There 
are cases which have asserted that ‘fraud’ is one of the elements whereas 
there are other cases which state that fraud is not necessarily required to 
prove deepening insolvency.247 In Seitz, the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania, 
limited the scope of deepening insolvency to situations in which the 
defendants engaged in fraud, which means ‘fraud’ on the part of directors has 
to be present in order to prove deepening insolvency.248
On the other hand, some courts have found that negligence is sufficient and 
thus, the defendant need not have engaged in fraudulent behaviour.249 As 
long as the corporation has suffered losses due to a director’s breach, it is 
sufficient to hold directors liable for deepening insolvency.250
                                               
245 D E Gordon, ‘The Expansion of Deepening Insolvency Standing: Beyond Trustees and 
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246 Kathy Bazoian Phelps, ‘Deepening Insolvency as A Cause of Action and as A Theory of 
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247 Seitz v Detweiler, Hershey & Assocsiation P C (In re CitX Corp), 448 F 3d 672 
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(Bankr DNH 2007).
249 Smith v Arthur Andersen LLP, 421 F 3d 989, 995 (9th Cir, 2005).
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Therefore, deepening insolvency is a cause of action which creditors can seek 
in order to claim against a director’s breach of duty not to incur debts while 
near insolvency. However, it is imperative to note that the elements to 
successfully establish this breach are unclear at best.251
1 Damages for Deepening Insolvency
The damages for deepening insolvency vary between each jurisdiction
because the doctrine is not uniformly applied in the US.252 Lafferty’s case 
established that directors who contributed to the deepening of corporate 
insolvency could be liable for the total amount of the loss.253 There are little
academic discussion on compensation except to say that directors are liable 
for the total amount of loss caused (as found in Lafferty) but nothing beyond 
that on the quantum of damages that may be awarded against liable 
directors.254
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This next segment will compare each jurisdiction’s insolvent trading laws to 
assess their effectiveness protecting creditors’ interests. 
E Which is Better, Australia, China or the US?
This segment is an analysis of the three jurisdictions’ insolvent trading laws 
or similar laws. This is to determine which jurisdiction provides better 
protects creditors’ interests. It will first compare Australia’s and China’s 
insolvent trading laws followed by a comparison of Australia’s and the US’s
insolvent trading laws. 
The comparison will conclude that Australia arguably has better insolvent 
trading laws because the laws are clearer and directors have an active duty to 
protect creditors’ interests.
                                                                                                                                    
Advisors, 26th Annual Bankruptcy and Restructuring Conference, San Diego, 9-12 June 
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1 Australia and China
(a) Similarities
Australia and China have provisions which hold directors liable if their 
actions lead the company into insolvency or bankruptcy.255 Directors in both 
jurisdictions are held responsible for damaging creditors’ interests.
(b) Differences
Firstly, Australia’s insolvent trading laws set out the elements for insolvent 
trading and also circumstances in which directors are considered to have 
participated in insolvent trading. 256 Cases also supplement the Act by 
explaining the scope of circumstances that directors can be considered to 
have been involved in insolvent trading.257 For example, the Water Wheel
case explains the situations in which a director is considered to have failed to 
prevent a company from incurring debt.258 This case supplements sections 
588G(2) and 588G(3)(d).259
                                               
255 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 125; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G. 
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On the other hand, China has a dearth of academic or judicial discussion of 
the law in this area and there is no clear definition of insolvent trading or 
circumstances in which directors are considered to have participated in 
insolvent trading.260 This situation may cause creditors difficulty in suing 
directors, as has been discussed, the laws are limited in scope and unclear.261
Thus, Australia has arguably better laws to protect and enable creditors to 
take legal action against directors if the former’s interests are harmed by the 
latter.
Secondly, it is submitted that Australia has a better compensation scheme for
creditors than China. Under sections 588J, 588K and 588M of the Act, 
directors are liable to pay compensation equal to the amount of loss or 
damage suffered by all unsecured creditors whose debts were incurred in 
contravention of the duty to prevent insolvent trading during the company’s 
insolvency.262 Arguably these laws ensure that the creditors in Australia are 
                                               
260 John J Rapisardi and Binghao Zhao, ‘A Legal Analysis and Practical Application of the 
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Tomasic, ‘The Conceptual Structure of China’s New Corporate Bankruptcy Law’ in China’s 
New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (Ashgate, 2010) 15; Yujia Jiang, ‘The Curious Case of 
Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: A Comparative Study of US and Chinese Bankruptcy 
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The Perils of Legal Transplantation’ (2005) 28(1) Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 1, 53; Shu-Ching Jean Chen, ‘China’s Bankruptcy Big Bang’, 
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fairly compensated and that their interests are not prejudiced when directors 
breach their duties.263
The CBL provisions only state that offending director(s) will not be allowed 
to hold any directorial position for three years and there are no statutory 
creditors’ compensation that state that there is any compensation amount to 
be paid or compensation order to be made against the directors even if they 
are directly responsible for damaging creditors’ interests.264
Thus, Australia provides better protection of creditors’ interests than China in 
respect of director’s breach of duty to prevent insolvent trading. Australia has 
more stringent laws to ensure that creditors’ interests are well protected as 
compared to China, including placing a positive duty on directors in respect 
of their conduct. 
However, this discussion is not conclusive because China’s insolvent trading 
laws are still in their infancy and, as noted above, there is a dearth of 
academic commentary on the subject and few cases that rule on or discuss 
these laws. 265 Thus, the conclusion that Australia has better creditor 
protection laws is mainly based on a limited reading of the provisions as 
                                               
263 Ibid.
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enacted in CBL which over time (with more academic and judicial 
commentary on the subject) may be interpreted to have wider scope than they 
would presently seem to have. 
The next segment will compare Australia’s and the US’s laws on insolvent 
trading. As noted above, China adopted the US’s laws on a director’s duty of 
good faith when a company is near insolvency, thus, US will be used as a 
substitute for China’s laws in keeping with the thesis’ aim of comparing the 
jurisdictions of Australia and China.
2 Australia and the US
In the absence of literature which compares these jurisdictions, the 
comparisons discussed here are tendered by the author based on her own 
considered reflections and analysis. 
Australia enacts insolvent trading laws whereas the US applies deepening 
insolvency doctrine developed from case law. Although both enacted 
insolvent trading laws and the deepening insolvency doctrine protect 
creditors’ interests, Australia arguably has better protection as compared to 
the US because the directors have a positive duty to protect the creditors’ 
interests and the insolvent trading provisions are clearly and expressly spelt 
out.
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(a) Similarities
Firstly, insolvent trading and deepening insolvency allow creditors to sue 
directors when they breach their fiduciary duties.266
In Australia, creditors can sue directors if they suffered financial losses due to 
the directors’ breach of duty in preventing insolvent trading.267 However, as 
previously mentioned, in order for creditors to bring an action against 
directors, they are required to obtain a written consent from the company’s 
liquidator.268 Liquidators are given three months to give their written consent 
to the creditors, failing which, creditors can apply for leave of the court for 
the proceedings to begin at the end of three months.269 Even if the liquidator 
gives to the creditor a written statement why the proceedings should not be 
commenced within the stipulated three months, creditors can still apply for 
leave to the court for the proceedings to begin.270 If the court has granted
leave, creditors may prosecute the proceedings without the liquidator’s 
consent.271
Similar to insolvent trading laws in Australia, creditors have a standing to sue 
directors for their breach under the deepening insolvency theory.272 As been 
noted in Lafferty, the court held that deepening insolvency is a valid cause of 
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action and creditors can bring a direct claim against directors for their alleged 
breach.273
Thus, both jurisdictions’ laws protect creditors by allowing them to claim 
against directors if they suffer any losses. Nevertheless, Australia shows that 
it has better creditors protection laws compared to the US because directors in 
Australia have a statutory duty to protect creditors’ interests in which there 
are clearer guides for creditors to sue directors if they suffer any injury 
caused by directors’ breach.
(b) Differences
There is an express duty in Australia for directors to prevent insolvent trading 
whereas there are no similar provisions in the US.274 Directors in Australia 
are subjected to a fiduciary and statutory duty to not prejudice creditors’ 
interests when the company is insolvent or when the company is near 
insolvency.275 If directors reasonably suspect that the company is insolvent at 
the time debt was incurred, they must take positive steps to prevent any 
trading that may further increase the debt; failure to take positive steps could 
result in a breach and the directors could be personally liable for any losses 
caused to creditors.276 A director’s duty is still considered breached if they do 
                                               
273 Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v R F Lafferty and Co, 267 F 3d 340, 347-50 
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not disclose or prevent any insolvent transaction in which other directors are 
involved.277
On the other hand, the US does not have any statute that prevents insolvent 
trading; instead, the deepening insolvency theory as mentioned above, forms 
a common law safeguard against insolvent trading.278 In addition, directors in 
the US do not have a positive duty to protect creditors’ interests.279 The 
directors are only liable when they prolonged a company’s insolvency when a 
company should have filed for insolvency.280
Further, Australia has better guidelines for creditors to bring an action against 
directors. This is because the insolvent trading laws are enshrined in statute 
and there are proper guidelines which creditors can follow in order to prove 
the elements of proving insolvent trading.281
On the contrary, there are no statutes in the US which clearly list the elements 
of deepening insolvency. Deepening insolvency cases provide different 
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opinions on the elements.282 As stated above, there are cases which require 
fraud to prove deepening insolvency,283 while there are other cases which 
state that negligence is sufficient to prove that deepening insolvency. 284
Therefore, this may cause confusion among creditors as to whether there is a 
chance of winning a legal action against directors.
Hence, creditors may not have full confidence in bringing an action against 
directors in the US, and thus, arguably Australia would appear to have better 
creditor protection laws compared to the US.285 The question may then be 
posed turn to that, if Australia has better creditor protection laws than the US, 
does this mean that because China’s laws are modelled on US laws, Australia 
thus has better insolvent trading laws than China?
It must be noted that the results from comparing the US and Australia be 
applied as a strict China and Australia comparison. This is because 
fundamental differences in China’s legal and political system may lead to 
laws being developed quite differently. However, to the extent that there 
might be some similar developments in the law in China to the US (if case 
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law in China takes a similar course to case law in the US on the issue of 
deepening insolvency) then the above analysis might be useful, although 
admittedly, it remains to be seen what course Chinese case law will take.
F Conclusion of Directors’ Duties (Insolvent Trading)
This Chapter discussed a director’s duty to prevent insolvent trading in the 
jurisdictions of Australia, China and the US. In conclusion, Australia 
arguably has better creditors’ protection in relation to insolvent trading. 
This Chapter first compared Australia and China, and argued that Australia 
has better insolvent trading laws. Australia has a compensation plan whereas 
China does not.286 This means creditors in Australia are reasonably certain 
they will be reimbursed if they are successful in court whereas in China,
successful cases only result in directors being disqualified from their 
directorial positions.287
Both Australia and China have statutory provisions on insolvent trading laws, 
but Australia’s laws are clearer compared to China as discussed above.288  It 
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is important to note that this evaluation is based on the CBL provisions 
because there are only a few cases concerning directors’ duty to prevent 
insolvent trading, perhaps due to the fact that the right to sue directors might 
be seen as undermining the state’s authority since SOEs still tightly controls 
and influences China’s company’s decisions.289
This Chapter also compared Australia’s and the US’s insolvent trading laws 
because as noted above, Chinese directors’ duty to be honest when the
company is near insolvency is modelled on the US’s directors’ duty during 
deepening insolvency.290  
Unlike in the US, directors in Australia have an active duty to prevent 
insolvent trading in order to ensure creditors’ interests are protected. 291
Australia also has better guidelines for creditors when to bring an action 
against directors compared to the US.292 Thus, Australia has better insolvent 
trading laws to protects creditors’ interests than US, and so even if China 
were to develop its CBL along US lines, having modelled its laws on the US, 
Australia’s insolvent trading laws would still offer better protection to 
creditor’s than China’s. 
Based on the analysis of Australia and China, the author suggests that China 
should adopt a similar model to Australia’s compensation plan. This may 
                                               
289 This was discussed above in Chapter III, page 50, and footnote 218.
290 [Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of 
China) National People’s Congress, Order No 54, 1 June 2007, art 125; Paul Omar, 
International Insolvency Law: Reforms and Challenges (Ashgate Publishing, 2013) 96.
291 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588G.
292 Ibid s 588M.
70
help China to take a step forward to protect creditors because courts are able 
to order directors to compensate the creditors instead of only being able to 
disqualify directors from their directorial position
The next Chapter, Piercing the Corporate Veil will compare the 
circumstances in which courts can pierce the corporate veil in Australia and 
China. 
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III PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
A Introduction
This Chapter will discuss and compare China’s and Australia’s veil-piercing 
laws to analyse which jurisdiction provides a better protection for creditors’ 
interests, concluding that overall, that Australia accords a better creditors’
protection than China.  
A company is a legal person separate from its controllers, namely, directors 
and majority shareholders.293 This means that although a company can be 
sued, the controllers will not usually be liable for the company’s debts.294 A 
creditor can only take action against the company and not the controllers 
unless the court pierces the corporate veil. 295 This  will only occur in 
circumstances where the behaviour of the company’s controllers is seen as 
abusing the corporate veil.296
This Chapter first explains the basis for veil piercing in Australia, covering 
the grounds of fraud and agency before venturing into veil piercing in group 
companies. The discussion then shifts to China, analysing Articles 20 and 64 
of the revised CCL, which form China’s veil piercing doctrine. The final 
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segment of this Chapter wraps up with a comparison of both jurisdictions’ 
veil piercing doctrines from the perspective of creditors’ interests protection.
B Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia
The discussion on the veil piercing doctrine begins with three fundamental 
common law factors which allow a court to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
the controllers liable for the company’s debts.
Australia adopted the UK veil piercing laws and has developed them since 
one of the first Australian piercing cases in 1911.297 The significant cases of 
Lipman v Jones and Adam v Cape established three different factors which 
allow a court to pierce the corporate veil.298 The three factors are fraud, 
agency and group companies (single economic unit).299 The circumstances 
that allow courts to pierce the corporate veil of a group of companies are 
insolvent trading, agency and tort liabilities.300 Tort liabilities will not be 
discussed as this thesis is aimed at analysing creditors’ interests in the context 
of creditors’ contractual rights against the company rather than their general 
legal rights.
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It is important to note that Australia also has statutory veil piercing laws. 
These are directors’ liabilities for insolvent trading (which was discussed in 
Chapter II – Directors’ Duties (Insolvent Trading)),301 unpaid tax,302 personal 
liabilities of directors of trustee corporations303 and a holding company’s 
liabilities for its subsidiary’s debts.304 The segment in this Chapter regarding 
statutory veil piercing will only discuss a holding company’s liabilities for a 
subsidiary’s debts as because the focus of this Chapter is on the common law 
factors.305
Fraud is one of the three factors in which courts pierce the corporate veil.
1 Fraud
This segment discusses fraud as one of the factors which will trigger veil-
piercing doctrine. Fraud occurs when directors or shareholders use a 
company to evade legal obligations, or misrepresent its performance or 
financial obligations or its financial structure.306 Courts are not hesitant to 
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pierce the corporate veil when a company is incorporated to defraud creditors 
or to circumvent laws.307
Plaintiffs have to show that a company is a sham or mere façade in order to 
pierce the corporate veil.308 There is a distinction between sham and mere 
façade and the next segment discusses both these limbs of fraud.
A company is a sham when it is incorporated to disguise the true intention of 
its operators or to avoid any legal obligations.309 Gilford Motor Company Ltd 
v Horne is an example in which the corporate veil was pierced because the 
company was a sham used for fraud.310
Horne was an ex-employee of Gilford Motor Company and the employment 
contract provided that he could not solicit customers of the company during 
his employment or after the termination of his appointment. In order to defeat 
this, he incorporated a limited company in his wife’s name and solicited his 
former employee’s customers on the company’s behalf. Gilford Motor 
Company brought an action seeking to restrain Horne and the company he 
formed from soliciting their customers. The Court of Appeal held that the 
main purpose of the new company’s incorporation was to perpetrate fraud. 
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Thus, the company was regarded as a sham to mask his wrongdoings. An 
injunction was granted against Horne and the new company.311
Fraud also occurs when a company is a mere façade concealing true facts.312  
In Jones v Lipman, ‘mere façade concealing true fact’ refers to a company 
which is formed to avoid pre-existing obligations.313 Australian courts have 
followed Jones v Lipman and Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne. 314
Jenkinson J in Dennis Willcox stated that:
The separate legal personality of a company is to be disregarded only if the 
court can see that there is, in fact or in law, a partnership between 
companies in a group or that there is a mere sham or façade in which that 
company is playing a role, or that the creation or use of the company was 
designed to enable a legal or fiduciary obligation to be evaded or a fraud to 
be perpetrated.315
This statement shows that Australian courts are willing to pierce the 
corporate veil when a company is a sham or mere façade, which affirms the 
decisions in Jones v Lipman and Gilford Motor Company Ltd v Horne.316
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A recent example is Re Neo. 317 In that case, the Australian Immigration 
Review Tribunal reviewed a decision to refuse a company’s sponsorship of 
visa for an overseas applicant. The company was formed on the same day that 
the application was lodged, and never carried out any business. The Tribunal 
ruled that, ‘the company was merely a vehicle used to circumvent Australian 
migration law. It was only a façade, its true purpose being to allow the 
applicants to remain in the country’.318
It is well established that the courts will not allow the corporate form to be 
used for the purposes of fraud or as a device to evade a contractual or other 
legal obligation, a principle which is referred to hereafter as the ‘fraud 
exception’ to the Salomon’s principle.319 Thus, fraud is a valid avenue which 
creditors can pierces the corporate veil if a company is found to be a sham or 
mere façade.320
The next segment will discuss Agency, the second factor which allows 
Australian courts to pierce the corporate veil.
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2 Agency
Agency states that a shareholder or a parent company has such a strong 
degree of control that the company is deemed to be an agent of the 
shareholder or the parent company.321 Therefore, the acts of the company are 
deemed to be acts of the shareholder or the parent company.322 If a subsidiary
or a company is found to be acting as an agent for a parent company or a 
shareholder, the courts will pierce the corporate veil.323 There are two types 
of agency, express and implied. 
An express agency agreement is where one legal entity acts under the express 
authority of another legal entity. 324 Veil piercing occurs because the law of 
agency acknowledges that the principal (shareholder or parent company) is 
bound, by, and responsible for the acts of its agent (company or 
subsidiary). 325 Therefore, the veil-piercing doctrine deems the principal 
responsible for the acts of the agent.
An implied agency relationship arises where the principal places the agent in 
circumstances where it is understood that the agent represents and acts for the
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principal.326 However, an agency relationship is not always present between 
parent and subsidiary companies or between a shareholder and a company. 
Atkinson J in Smith, Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham stated that there are 
six requirements that must be established before an implied agency 
relationship is established.327 The six requirements that were stated by his 
Honour are:328
1) Were the profits treated as the profits of the parent?
2) Were the persons conducting the business appointed by the parent?
3) Was the parent the head and the brain of the trading venture?
4) Did the parent govern the venture; decide what should be done and 
what capital should be embarked on the venture?
5) Did the parent make the profits by its skill and direction?
6) Was the parent in effectual and constant control?
The decision and the application of the six factors in Smith, Stone and Knight 
Ltd v Birmingham, 329 was followed in the Australian case of Spreag v 
Paerson Pty Ltd,330 where the court held a parent company liable for the 
subsidiary’s misleading and deceptive statements and breaches of implied 
terms of a contract.331
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The Spreags were builders who purchased a brickmaker from Paeson Pty Ltd 
(‘Paeson’). 332   The purchase was conditional on Paeson sending staffs to 
demonstrate use of the machinery. Once delivered, the demonstration staffs
were unable to adjust the machinery to produce marketable bricks at the 
negotiated rate of production, roughly 500 to 600 bricks per hour. The 
Spreags sought damages from inter alia, Componere Systems Pty Ltd 
(‘Componere’) which had banked Spreags’ cheque for the purchase of the 
brickmaker.333
The court found that Paeson did not have any bank account, assets or 
premises, account books or profit and loss statements. Componere made 
payments on Paeson’s behalf, including wages. Moneys received by Paeson, 
or on its behalf were paid to Componore. The business card of Paeson’s 
salesperson, Foster with whom the Spreags dealt suggested that he was a 
representative of Componere.  After considering the six factors in Smith, 
Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham,334 Sheppard J held that Componere 
should be seen as the principal of this business transaction and the subsidiary, 
Paeson was carrying on business for Componere as an agent. 
Although the law in Australia acknowledges that agency is a valid ground to 
pierce the corporate veil, there are some cases that require more evidence 
than a mere fact that a company is under control of a parent company.335 This 
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means that Australia sets a higher threshold than the UK to prove an implied 
agency relationship.336 In Pioneer v Yelnah, the court noted that it is not 
sufficient to create an implied agency between a parent and subsidiary 
company even though there is an overwhelming control of the former over 
the latter.337
Besanko J in Bird Cameron 338 stated that the most important factor to 
determine agency is the first question identified by Atkinson J in Smith, Stone 
and Knight Ltd v Birmingham.339 His Honour relied on that question and 
determined whether the directors in the company owned the profits made by 
the company. His Honour stated:
The first matter identified by Atkinson J in Smith, Stone and Knight v 
Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 All ER 116 [that is where the profits of 
the business are treated as the profits of the parent company] is an 
important, sometimes very important indicator of whether or not there is 
an agency relationship340…However, too much emphasis on the other five 
[criteria] related to control and control of itself cannot be a decisive 
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indicator of agency. If it were otherwise there would often be an agency 
between a parent company and its subsidiary or a sole shareholder and his 
company.341
This recent case reaffirms the importance of ownership of profits in 
identifying an agency relationship between members of a company or 
between a subsidiary and a parent company.342 This case is also important in 
identifying the significant element in determining an implied agency 
relationship, which is whether the profits of the subsidiary company are 
treated as profits of the parent company. 343 The requirements to prove 
implied agency between a shareholder and the company is the same as 
above.344 Creditors have to prove that shareholders have an excessive control 
over the company as well as treating the company’s profit as their own.345
Summing up, agency is a valid ground for piercing the corporate veil in 
Australia.346 There are two types of agency, namely express and implied 
agency. The veil is pierced when a shareholder or a parent company has 
excessive control over the company or its subsidiary and owns its profits. 347
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The third factor is when a group of companies are treated as a single 
economic unit. The next segment discusses instances when a court can pierce 
the veil of group companies.
3 Piercing the Veil of Group Companies (Single Economic Unit)
This segment will discuss the factors which will allow the courts to treat a 
group of companies as a single unit or a ‘single economic unit’.
Companies often operate as a group in a commercial sphere and are identified 
as corporate groups or group companies.348 Although they operate as group 
companies, Salomon’s principle allows each of them to be identified as 
separate legal entities.349 Roskill LJ in The Albarzero has also noted this 
principle.350 His Honour stated:
Each company in a group of companies… is a separate legal entity 
possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities so that the rights of one 
company in a group cannot be exercised by another company in that group 
even though the ultimate benefit of the exercise of those rights would inure 
beneficially to those person or body corporate irrespective of the person or 
body in whom those rights were vested in law. It is perhaps permissible 
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under modern commercial conditions to regret existence of those principles. 
But it is impossible to deny, ignore or disobey them.351
In other words, benefits and rights of a company are distinct from each other 
and this has to be acknowledged by each of the companies, directors, 
shareholders, employees and creditors.352  However, a court will pierce the 
corporate veil on the ground of ‘group enterprises’ where there is a sufficient 
degree of common ownership and common enterprise.353
To this end, creditors are entitled to look at the resources of companies 
operating as a group if the court pierces the corporate veil of each of the 
group companies.354 The next segment will discuss the circumstances which 
allow courts to pierce the corporate veil of group companies. 
(a) Insolvent Trading
One of the factors which allow a court to pierce the corporate veil of group 
companies is when subsidiaries are involved in insolvent trading.355 The 
discussion will only focus on a holding company liability when the subsidiary 
incurs debts during insolvency.
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Section 599V of the Act states that a holding company is liable if it fails to 
prevent one of its subsidiaries from incurring debt when there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the subsidiary is near insolvency.356 A subsidiary 
incurs debt when a company ‘acts to expose itself contractually to an 
obligation to make a future payment of a sum of money as a debt’.357 It also 
incurs a debt when it exposes itself to an obligation to pay taxes, for example, 
sales tax.358
Section 588W of the Act allows a liquidator to recover debts on behalf of the 
creditors when a holding company contravenes section 588V and becomes 
insolvent.359  Section 544W of the Act also states that the debts have to be 
either wholly or partly unsecured in order to recover from the company.360
However, sections 588R and 588T of the Act provide that only creditors can 
commence proceedings directly against directors for insolvent trading. 361
Thus, the liquidator will commence proceedings against holding companies 
on behalf of all the creditors for the losses and damages suffered by them.362
                                               
356 Ibid.
357 Hawkins v Bank of China (1992) 26 NSWLR 562 at 572 per Gleeson CJ.
358 Sales tax is tax imposed by the government at the point of sale on retail goods and 
services, Powell v Fryer [2001] SASC 59.
359 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 588W.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid ss 588R and 588T.
362 Murphy, above n 328, 256.
85
(b) Agency
The second factor which allows the court to pierce the corporate veil of group 
companies is agency.363 This segment will not analyse and discuss agency 
because it has been discussed above and the circumstances in which creditors 
can sue the holding company are the same. It is sufficient to note that in 
Australia, agency is one factor courts may utilize to pierce the corporate veil 
of group companies. 
Agency, as mentioned above, occurs when a holding company has effective 
control over the subsidiary and the subsidiary’s actions are alleged to be the 
actions of the holding company.364 In these circumstances, courts may pierce 
the corporate veil of group companies and allow creditors to claim damages 
or compensation from the holding company.365 Also mentioned above, in 
Bird Cameron, Besanko J noted that the holding company must have 
excessive control over its subsidiary and own its profits in order to prove an 
implied agency.366
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In sum, there are three factors, which will pierce the corporate veil in 
Australia – fraud, agency and group companies.367 These principles were 
inherited from the UK and allow creditors to petition a court to pierce the 
corporate veil to recover debts.368 This avenue of recovery is also available in 
respect of group companies and creditors can sue holding companies for their 
subsidiaries’ debts.369
The next part will discuss China’s veil piercing laws. 
C Piercing the Corporate Veil in China
Chinese Company Law 1994 was China’s first company law legislation and 
only focused on company registration, restructuring states enterprises and 
introducing joint stock companies to attract foreign investments and the 
concepts of limited liability and separate legal entity status.370 There was no 
veil-piercing doctrine and as a result, there were many corporate veil abuses. 
An example of this is where the shareholder formed an undercapitalised 
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company to defraud creditors.371 Although some courts pierce the corporate 
veil despite a statutory absence of veil-piercing doctrine, not all courts do 
so.372 Chinese lawmakers acknowledged the existence of corporate veil abuse 
and resolved to draft a revised CCL.373  In 2006, a revised CCL was enacted 
and it introduced veil-piecing doctrine to the corporate world in China.  The 
Law Commission of China also states that in circumstances where there is a 
need to protect creditors’ interests and in the interests of justice, courts can 
implement veil piercing doctrine.374
The revised CCL states that shareholders are held accountable if they abuse 
the principles of limited liability and separate legal entity status. 375
Shareholders are jointly and severally liable if they abuse these principles to 
                                               
371 [Rosin Factory of Wuzhou v Huajin Materials and Vill. Enter Commision of Jiangcheng, 
Guangdong – Undercapitalization case] [1991] [Gazette of the Supreme People’s Republic 
of China]; David M Albert, ‘Adressing Abuse of the Corporate Entity in the People’s 
Republic of China: New Thoughts on China’s Need for A Defined Veil Piercing Doctrine’ 
(2002) 23(4) The University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 873, 885.
372 Supreme People’s Court has the authority to decide cases in the interest of justice. They 
also have the authority to fill out the gaps where the legislation is incomplete and have very 
great importance in this circumstance, William C Jones, Basic Principles of Civil Law in 
China (M E Sharpe Inc, 1991) 25.
373 Chinese lawmakers have also been under pressure to include veil piercing laws into the 
Chinese Company Law. This is because there was a need to keep up with the rapid economic 
development and globalisation in China and also to attract foreign investment, Shuangge 
Wen, ‘The Ideals and Reality of A Legal Transplant – The Veil-Piercing Doctrine in China’ 
(2014) 50(2) Stanford Journal of International Law 219, 330; Chao Xi, ‘Piercing the 
Corporate Veil in China: How Did We Get There?’ (2011) 5 Journal of Business Law 413, 
418; [Rosin Factory of Wuzhou v Huajin Materials and Vill. Enter Commision of 
Jiangcheng, Guangdong – Undercapitalization case] [1991] [Gazette of the Supreme 
People’s Republic of China].
374 Kangtai Cao, ‘An Explanation to the Amended Draft of Company Law of People’s 
Republic of China’ (Speech delivered at the Fourteenth Session at the Tenth National 
People’s Congress, 25 February 2005).
375 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, arts 20 and 64.
88
avoid debt-payment. 376 These revised laws were intended to protect the 
company and creditors.377
The next segment will discuss the veil piercing provisions, specifically, 
Articles 64 and 20 and other circumstances which academics suggest may 
enable the courts to pierce the corporate veil. 
1 Article 64 – Commingling of Assets
Article 64 of CCL deals with a sole shareholder commingling his or personal 
assets with the company’s assets.378
One person companies can be incorporated in China, in which there is only 
one shareholder (in which he or she solely funds the company).379 However, 
the lawmakers were concerned that a sole shareholder may take advantage of 
the company’s assets or profits for personal use, thereby defrauding 
creditors. 380 In order to prevent such abuse, CCL provided veil-piercing 
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provisions specifically catered to tackle sole shareholder limited liability 
companies.381
Article 64 of the CCL provides that:
The shareholder of a one-person limited liability company who is unable 
to prove that the company’s assets are independent of the shareholder’s 
personal assets shall bear jointly liability for the company’s debt.382  
The sole shareholder has to prepare and produce relevant documentation in 
order to prove that the company and their personal assets are independent.383
In particular, he or she has to produce an annual financial accounting report 
for auditing and a set of records and documents evidencing the company’s 
trading transactions over the relevant reporting period. 384 If there is any 
ambiguity or suspicion that there is commingling of assets, the shareholder 
may be sued under article 64.385
The sole shareholder bears the burden of proof if he or she is sued to show 
that the company is an independent entity where its assets are separately 
owned and managed.386 He or she has to produce other documents besides the 
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annual financial accounting report and trading records to prove that there was 
no commingling of assets.387
For example, when a sole shareholder sets up a company and operates their 
business from their personal home, they have to be able to demonstrate that 
the house is not acquired with funds related to the company’s assets. They 
need to produce documents such as the certificate of title, house contract or 
bank loan in addition to a set of the company’s financial reports and trading 
records to prove that the house is separate from the company. If they are 
unable to produce them, they are personally liable to compensate the 
creditors. This is because they are deemed have used the funds from 
company’s assets to buy their house, which decreases the funds that are 
available to pay the creditors, thereby injuring creditors’ interests.388
In conclusion, if creditors find that a sole shareholder has commingled his 
company’s assets and their personal assets, they can sue the shareholder 
under article 64 of CCL.
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The next segment discusses the second statutory avenue which creditors can 
seek if a shareholder abuses the limited liability and separate legal entity 
status principles.
2 Article 20 – Avoiding Payment
Article 20 of the CCL provides that the shareholders of a company must not 
abuse the company’s legal person status or shareholders’ limited liability (by 
avoiding payment to creditors) and this extends to all companies in China.389
If shareholders abuse these principles and damage creditors’ interests, they 
are personally liable for damages, a concept as discussed below.390
There are three elements that courts must consider in order to pierce the 
corporate veil under Article 20 of the CCL.391 The three elements are: i) there 
must be an abuse; ii) creditors’ interests are seriously damaged due to the 
abuse, and iii) there must be a relationship between the shareholders’ actions 
and the creditors’ loss.392
Firstly, there has to be evidence that there is an abuse of the company’s 
separate legal entity status and limited liability protection.393 ‘Abuse’ in this 
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context refers to avoiding payment of company’s debts. 394 This occurs when 
a shareholder of a heavily indebted company incorporates another company 
using funds from the former company and transferring over its valuable 
assets to form the new company.395 This is detrimental to the first company’s 
creditors because in the event of insolvency, there are less assets to pay off 
creditors. The law will consider the new company a sham because the above-
mentioned tactic is an abuse of the corporate veil to avoid payment of the 
former company’s debts.396
The second element is that the interests of the creditors must be ‘seriously 
damaged’ under Article 20. However, there is no statutory definition of 
‘seriously damaged’, in the CCL. 397 Yousu Zhou proposes that the courts 
should consider three limbs when determining the term ‘seriously damaged’ 
when applying the veil-piercing doctrine.398 The three limbs are: the actual 
damage to the creditors, the ability of a company to pay the injured creditors 
and the intention of the shareholders.399
The first limb assesses actual damage to creditors. This is determined by 
assessing the amount of debt that the company is not able to pay to the 
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creditors.400 The larger the amount of actual damage, the more serious the 
damage caused to the creditors.401
The second limb measures the ability of a company to pay the injured 
creditors. The courts will evaluate this ability by reviewing the company’s 
assets.402 If the assets decreased dramatically because the shareholders used 
the company’s assets or funds to create another company, the courts may 
proclaim that the creditors’ interests are seriously damaged.403
The final limb is that shareholders must have the intention to injure the 
creditors when committing any activities that are alleged to have abused the 
corporate veil.404 Zhou proposed a test similar to Australia’s ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ test. 405 If it is reasonably foreseeable that the shareholders’ 
actions would injure creditors’ interests, yet they still continue with their 
actions, the shareholders’ intention to abuse the corporate veil will be deemed 
to be established.406
Thus, if these three limbs are satisfied, the second element will be established
and shareholders will be accountable to creditors under Article 20.
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The last element that the court has to consider when piercing the corporate 
veil under Article 20 is that there must be a relationship between 
shareholders’ actions and creditors’ loss.407 There must be evidence of the 
shareholders causing the creditor’s loss and damage.408 For example, if the 
shareholders of a heavily indebted company have not used its assets or funds 
from the assets to set up another company, the ability of the heavily indebted 
company to repay the creditors would not have decreased.409
Thus, the court will be more willing or prepared to pierce the corporate veil if 
the above three factors are present.410 If the court finds that shareholders have 
transferred assets from an indebted company to a new company, creditors 
from the former company may ‘follow’ the assets to the latter company, and 
claim their debt from it.411
Besides the corporate abuses listed above, Articles 64 and 20, there are other 
types of abuse. These abuses include avoiding contractual or statutory 
obligation and undercapitalization and these will now be examined.412
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3 Other Types of Abuses
(a) Avoiding Contractual or Statutory Obligation
The CCL does not specify any other circumstances that are considered to be 
an abuse of the corporate veil, but the SPC has paid close attention to other 
types of abuse such as fraud.413
Some academics have suggested that shareholders who use the company to 
avoid contractual or statutory obligations is another type of abuse which 
courts may consider when piercing the corporate veil.414 This is similar to 
Australia’s fraud principle mentioned above.
Some shareholders avoid statutory obligations such as paying taxes by 
incorporating a company.415 A shareholder who is required to refrain from 
non-competitive activities from his or her former employment (due to a non-
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competition agreement) is allegedly in breach of their contractual obligations 
if they set up a company to carry out their work.416
The next type of corporate abuse by shareholders is undercapitalisation.
(b) Undercapitalisation
There are no provisions in CCL addressing whether undercapitalisation is 
another form of abuse that may trigger the veil-piercing doctrine. However, 
academics such as Jinwei Feng and Xianchu Zhang state that courts may be 
willing to pierce the corporate veil based on this factor to protect creditors’ 
interests.417
Both academics explain that as Chinese courts have in the past pierced the 
corporate veil despite an absence of statutory provisions on veil piercing, the 
courts may pierce the veil if there has been corporate abuse via 
undercapitalisation’.418
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This is seen in a 1991 case, Rosin Factory of Wuzhou v Huajin where the 
court pierced the corporate veil.419 In this case, the court found that the Rosin 
company was only a shell company with no capital and no ability to perform 
any contracts, thus did not meet the conditions of a ‘limited liability 
company’. The sole shareholder was held liable for undercapitalisation.420
In 1994, the SPC also pierced the corporate veil for undercapitalisation.421 An 
agriculture machine, a metal plate plant company and a municipal old age 
commission company established a biotech company. According to the 
articles of association, each party was to contribute RMB 100,000 in 
registered capital. However, the old age commission failed to pay its 
registered capital, therefore the actual paid in capital of the company was 
only RMB 200,000. The company then borrowed RMB 200,000 from a bank 
with a local technology company as their guarantor. When the company 
failed to pay back the loan, the guarantor paid the amount owed to the bank.
The guarantor then sought repayment from the company but the company 
was only able to repay RMB 6,000. The guarantor then sued all three 
investors in the company, claiming that they should be responsible for the 
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debts of the company. The defendant company argued that it was properly 
established and licensed, therefore, should be protected by the corporate veil.
The court decided that even though the company was issued a business 
license, it did not qualify as a legal person because it did not meet the 
required minimum capital of a limited liability company. Hence, the court 
pierced the corporate veil and held all investors jointly and severally liable. 
The guarantor was able to recover the outstanding amount owed from the 
three investors.422
Feng and Zhang stated that the courts are willing to pierce the corporate veil 
in the interests of justice and to protect creditors’ interests.423 They have also 
stated that the courts pierce the corporate veil due to undercapitalisation even 
when there is a statutory absence of the veil-piercing doctrine. 424 It is 
imperative to note that because China’s legal system is based on civil law, 
cases hold no precedent value. Thus, despite encouraging case law 
demonstrating courts piercing the corporate veil due to undercapitalisation, it 
is ultimately unclear whether courts will pierce the corporate veil due to 
corporate abuse of undercapitalisation.425
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In summary, creditors are able to bring an action against shareholders under 
Articles 20 and 64 of CCL if there is any commingling of assets or if 
shareholders avoid debt-payment.426 In addition, courts in China have paid a 
close attention to other types of abuses which may also trigger corporate veil-
piercing doctrine including avoiding legal contractual and statutory 
obligations and undercapitalisation although the law is unclear in respect of 
these other types of abuse.427
The next segment will analyse and compare Australia’s and China’s veil 
piercing laws discussed in this Chapter, thereby determining which 
jurisdiction accords better protection for creditors.
D Analysis and Comparison of Australia and China
It is clear from the outset that Australia arguably accords better certainty and 
protection due to the wider range of legal avenues a creditor can seek against 
the owners of the company. As compared to Australia, China has only two 
statutory Articles and other types of avenues, which are unpredictable in 
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terms of their chances of success as there is no certainty that a Chinese court 
will follow past decisions.428
As mentioned, China has only recently enacted veil-piercing provisions via 
the CCL in 2006 to address the increasing numbers of abusing the corporate 
veil whereas veil piercing doctrine has been present in Australia since 
1911.429
China’s veil-piercing provisions are drafted vaguely and as noted above, 
there are limited circumstances on when courts can pierce the corporate veil 
and even then, creditors can only sue shareholders.430 Since China does not 
have the doctrine of judicial precedent (stare decisis), it is unclear whether 
other types of corporate veil abuses can be valid grounds for creditors to 
bring a claim against shareholders.431 Hence, creditors in China are poorly 
protected compared to Australia’s.
The author will discuss each of these points below, covering Chinese 
statutory ambiguity, Chinese limited legal avenues, the doctrine of judicial 
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precedent (or rather lack thereof) and the ability to recover from only 
shareholders in China.
1 Chinese Statutory Ambiguity
CCL’s provisions on veil-piercing doctrine are ambiguous compared to 
Australia’s veil-piercing doctrine. This is because CCL provides very little 
guidance on the scope of piercing the corporate veil.432 There are no defined 
terms in the statute and it does not specify the circumstances in which the 
corporate veil may be pierced.433 Article 20 of CCL states that: 
The shareholders of a company shall comply with the laws, administrative 
regulations and articles of association, and shall exercise the shareholder’s 
rights according to law. None of them may injure any of the interests of 
the company or of other shareholders by abusing the shareholder’s rights, 
or injure the interests of any creditor of the company by abusing the 
independent status person or the shareholder’s limited liabilities. 434
Where any of the shareholders of a company evades the payment of its 
debts by abusing the independent status of legal person or the 
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shareholder’s limited liabilities, and thus seriously damages the interests of 
any creditor, it shall bear joint liabilities for the debts of the company.435
The Article is unclear as to what constitutes ‘abusing independent status 
person or the shareholders liabilities’.436 Furthermore, the Article only states 
that when shareholders evades any debt-payment and causes injury to 
creditors, the shareholders are personally liable to the creditors.437 It is not 
certain whether the courts are only to consider this factor or any additional 
factors in deciding, whether to pierce the corporate veil.438
Article 64 of the CCL deals with commingling of assets by a sole
shareholder.439 This provision does not state the circumstances nor evidence 
needed to prove that the personal assets are independent from the company’s 
assets.440
                                               
435 Ibid.
436 Hui Huang, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: Where Is It Now and Where Is It 
Heading?’ (2012) 60 The American Journal of Comaparative Law 743, 763; Xinhu Lei and 
Bin Liu, ‘Expanding the Scope of the Body Eligible to Bring Piercing Cases’ (2010) Journal 
of Political Science and Law 5, 5.
437 Chao Xi, ‘ Piercing the Corporate Veil in China: How Did We Get There?’ (2011) 
Journal of Business Law 413, 414; Mark Wu, ‘Piercing China’s Corporate Veil: Open 
Questions from the New Company Law’ (2007) 117 Yale Law Journal 329, 334.
438 JiangYu Wang, Company Law in China: Regulation of Business Organizations in a 
Socialist Market Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 81; Yousu Zhou, New Survey on 
Corporation Law (The Law Press, 2006) 105.
439 [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (People’s Republic of China) National 
People’s Congress, 27 October 2005, art 64.
440 Yousu Zhou, New Survey on Corporation Law (The Law Press, 2006) 105; JiangYu 
Wang, Company Law in China: Regulation of Business Organizations in a Socialist Market 
Economy (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) 81; Baihua Ma, A Meager Opinion on Perfecting 
the Doctrine of Disregarding Legal Personality (20 November 2014) < 
http://www.chinacourt.org>. 
103
These provisions are also silent as to whether or not the existence of fraud is 
a factor that a court may consider.441 There is no explanation in the CCL 
whether fraud is a valid ground in itself or a pre-requisite to pierce the 
corporate veil.442
Hence, the 2006 enactments in the CCL would seem to accord limited 
protection of creditors’ interests because there is lack of guidance and 
considerable uncertainty surrounding these provisions.443
By contrast, in Australia, the courts have offered ample guidance on this 
issue.444 One such example is Besanko J in Bird Cameron in which he listed 
what are essential factors when determining an agency relationship.445 His 
Honour noted that there must be evidence of control of a parent of the 
subsidiary and the parent has to treat its subsidiary’s profits as its own.446
Also as mentioned previously, the courts in Australia have stated that in order 
for a court to pierce the corporate veil, a company has to be either a sham or 
mere façade concealing true facts.447 The circumstances listed by the courts in 
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both of these cases act as a guide for other courts when considering piercing 
the corporate veil.448
As a result, Australia arguably accords better protection for creditors’ 
interests because there is more guidance, which assists creditors regarding the 
criteria of a veil-piercing factor when bringing an action against the 
controllers of a company.449
The next point is absence of the doctrine of judicial precedent in China.
2 The Doctrine of Judicial Precedent
Judicial precedent enables creditors to be reasonably certain whether their 
action against controllers of a company will succeed. Since China has no 
doctrine of judicial precedent, creditors are unsure whether their interests are 
protected even though there has been success in bringing a claim against the 
shareholders in previous cases. 450 Since Australia has judicial precedent, 
lower courts are bound by higher court authority when deciding to pierce the 
corporate veil. This translates into assurance and certainty to creditors so their
legal venture to seek redress from shareholders will most likely not be in 
vain.
                                               
448 Re Neo (Unreported, Immigration Review Tribunal, Metledge M, 30 July 1997); Dennis 
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An example of judicial precedent was in Pioneer v Yelnah, mentionerd earlier 
in which the court noted that it is insufficient to create an implied agency 
between a parent and a subsidiary even when there is excessive control.451
This decision was followed by a more recent case, Bird Cameron, in which 
Besanko J stated that ‘control itself cannot be a decisive indicator of 
agency’.452
On the other hand, China is a civil law country therefore there is an absence 
of judicial precedent. 453 Although several courts have been willing to 
acknowledge other abuses not listed in the CCL, these courts’ decisions do 
not bind the lower courts.454 Hence, creditors are uncertain about whether 
successful cases of other types of corporate veil abuses are a valid ground for 
them to bring an action in court. 
The next point is Chinese creditors having limited legal avenues to sue 
owners of the company, as compared to Australia.
3 Chinese Limited Legal Avenues
As previously discussed in CCL, there are only two provisions that are 
related to veil-piercing doctrine: Articles 20 and 64.455 The CCL does not 
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state any other circumstances in which courts can pierce the corporate veil456. 
This means that creditors in China can only sue in two circumstances, either 
when a shareholder avoids any debt-payment or when a sole shareholder 
commingles their personal and company’s assets.457 In cases where there is 
fraud, undercapitalization or agency, it is not specified in the CCL whether 
these are valid grounds for shareholders to bring an action to court.458
On the other hand, as has already been noted, there are various circumstances 
that trigger veil piercing doctrine in Australia.459 In circumstance where the 
company is used as a sham or mere façade and prejudices creditors’ interests, 
creditors can sue the owner of the company for fraud.460 Agency is also one 
of the valid grounds that a court may consider when piercing the corporate 
veil. 461 The Bird Cameron case acknowledges that creditors can sue the 
parent company if they fail to recover any funds from the subsidiary based on 
an implied agency between parent company and subsidiary.462Agency also 
applies when a shareholder or owner is controlling the company and owns its 
profits. 463   Australian courts can pierce group companies if they find a 
                                               
456 Ibid.
457 Hanisch, above n 441, 48.
458 Huang, above n 443, 762.
459 Lipton, above n 3, 41.
460 Jones v Lipman [1962] All ER 442; Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne [1922] Ch 935; Adams 
v Cape plc [1990] Ch 433; Dennis Willcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
(1988) 79 ALR 267; Jennifer Payne, ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the 
Fraud Exception’ (1997) 56(2) Cambridge Law Journal 284, 285.
461 ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (Reg) (2005) 91 SASR 570; Smith, 
Stone and Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation [1939] 4 All ER 116; Spraeg v Paerson 
Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 679; Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd (1986) 5 
NSWLR 254 (SCNSW, Young J).
462 ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (Reg) (2005) 91 SASR 570, 112.
463 ACN 007 528 207 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bird Cameron (Reg) (2005) 91 SASR 570.
107
holding company failed to prevent its subsidiary from insolvent trading, as 
discussed above and in Chapter II.464
Thus, creditors in Australia arguably have better interest protection compared 
to Chinese creditors because veil-piercing doctrine in Australia encompasses 
more factors and situations in which creditors’ interests can be found to be 
prejudiced. 
The final point to be discussed is the fact that creditors can only sue 
shareholders in China.
4 Creditors can Only Sue Shareholders in China
The veil-piercing doctrine in Australia applies to the controllers of the 
company, who are the directors and shareholders.465 This means that creditors 
can bring an action against both directors and shareholders if they have 
abused the corporate veil.466 Helen Anderson, an academic, has identified that 
‘directors face personal liability so that the law can both correctly attribute 
liability to the party responsible for wrongdoing, either at common law or 
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under statute’.467 This means that creditors in Australia can sue directors if 
they have committed any corporate abuse such as fraud.468                                                                                   
Unlike in Australia, the provisions stated in CCL are only directed to 
shareholders.469 In other words, creditors can only sue shareholders when the 
latter abuse the corporate veil.470 The CCL is silent on whether creditors can 
sue directors who abuse the corporate veil. 471 It only states that the 
supervisory board can propose to remove directors if they violate any laws 
and does not state whether directors are personally liable if they have 
damaged creditors’ interests.472
There appears to be no academic commentary on the possible avenues 
outside of the CCL for which creditors can sue directors who abuse the 
corporate veil. The commentary only focuses on ‘suing shareholders’ and 
there is no commentary on ‘suing directors’. 473 The author suggests the 
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reason for this is likely to be due to the fact that suing directors might be seen 
as undermining the state authority since SOE still tightly controls and 
influences China’s company’s decisions.474
Thus, creditors in China have limited protection if directors have abused the 
corporate veil. There are no provisions that allow creditors to have any 
standing to sue directors for abusing the corporate veil; hence creditors in 
China are only limited to suing shareholders for any corporate veil abuse.475
E Conclusion and Reforms
The introduction of statutory veil piercing in China represents a positive legal 
development because now creditors can seek legal recourse in the event any 
corporate veil abuse such as commingling of assets.476 Furthermore, the Law 
Commission of China stated that in certain circumstances courts can pierce 
the corporate veil if there is a need to protect creditors’ interests. 477
However, Australia arguably provides better creditors protection in the event 
of shareholders’ or directors’ abuse compared to China. As noted above, 
creditors in Australia have more avenues to bring an action against the 
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controllers of a company, such as fraud, agency and single economic unit.478
There is also certainty with bringing a claim due to the court’s guidance and 
the doctrine of judicial precedent.479 Further, creditors in Australia are also 
allowed to sue both directors and shareholders of a company as opposed to 
creditors in China, who can only shareholders are liable. 480 Therefore, 
creditors in Australia are arguably better protected compared to China.
The author submits that the reason for such a great disparity between 
Australia’s and China’s creditors protection may be due to the Chinese 
lawmakers’ lack of experience.481 China’s legal development only began in 
the 1980s, which is only a short period for lawmakers to gain experience in 
order to draft laws.482 In Australia, on the other hand, where the laws were 
drafted as early in 1820s, and have been continually revised to a competent 
standard.483 Further, as previously mentioned, SOEs in China still have great 
and political influence in the country’s economic development.484 SOEs still 
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own shares in most of the JSCs, thus, the laws may drafted in a way so that 
creditors cannot take action against state shareholders. 485
Apart from what appears to be fairly obvious legislative reform, the author 
suggests some reforms that may narrow the disparity between Australia’s and 
China’s creditors’ protection. Firstly, The SPC in China could provide clear 
guidance to lower courts on elements that courts should consider, for 
example, elements of commingling of assets necessary for piercing the 
corporate veil. Although these principles would not be binding on lower 
courts, it is unlikely that they would be completely ignored as the SPC are 
allowed to publish guiding cases for lower courts.486 Although these cases 
will not be binding nor persuasive for future cases due to the absence of 
judicial precedent in China, the number of like cases decided with like 
outcomes will be a major development towards uniformity and may provide 
certainty for creditors.487
Secondly, it is further submitted that the State Council could provide 
commentaries on other types of corporate abuses such as fraud and 
undercapitalisation before amending the CCL. This gradualist approach 
allows the Chinese companies be on notice about the possibility of interested 
parties such as creditors piercing the corporate veil in circumstances other 
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than those stated in the CCL.488 The Chinese economy also can be maintained 
at the same time by giving assurance to creditors and potential investors that 
there interests are likely to have some degree of protection from corporate 
veil abuse. 489
The above suggestions may narrow the disparity between Australia’s and 
China’s creditor protection and may provide more certainty and uniformity in 
veil piercing cases. 
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IV CONCLUSION
In sum, it is submitted that Australia arguably accords better creditors’ 
protection than China. This argument is supported by evaluation of both 
jurisdictions’ directors’ duties to prevent insolvent trading (Chapter II) and 
veil piercing provisions in (Chapter III). 
The doctrine of limited liability and separate legal entity status was discussed 
in Chapter I, and its role as a shield of the controllers’ assets from any 
potential company’s creditors’ claims. Also discussed was how the creditors 
can still take action against the controllers when a director fails to prevent 
insolvent trading or when a controller has otherwise abused the corporate 
veil. 
This thesis then discussed and evaluated Australia’s and China’s veil piercing 
doctrines arguing that Australia provides better veil piercing laws in 
protecting creditors’ interests. To this end, this thesis first analysed Australian 
and Chinese directors’ duties to prevent insolvent trading because a breach of 
this duty may result in the courts to piercing the corporate veil. The following 
Chapter then analysed Australia’s and China’s veil piercing laws and factors
that may trigger courts to pierce the corporate veil. 
In Chapter II, it was noted that directors in Australia and China have a duty to 
protect creditors’ interests when companies are near insolvency. This thesis 
then compared both jurisdictions’ insolvent trading laws with the addition of 
another jurisdiction, the US. This was a necessary addition because China has 
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a dearth of academic literature in the area of insolvent trading laws as noted 
in Chapter II. In addition, academics have claimed that China’s director’s 
duty to be honest when company is near insolvency is said to have modelled 
on the US directors’ duties in deepening insolvency theory. 
Also noted in Chapter II was how CBL is vague about the circumstances in 
which a director is considered to have participated in insolvent trading as well 
as the fact that there are few guidelines for the courts to rule on insolvent
trading disputes. Thus, making it highly unlikely for a creditor bringing a 
potential claim for a director’s breach due to the unpredictability of the laws, 
and because the compensation orders appear to be non-existent. The author
then suggested that the reason for the apparent lack legal rights for creditors 
in this respect is because taking legal action to sue directors might undermine 
the state’s authority since SOEs still tightly control and influence China’s 
company’s decisions.490
Due to the lack of academic discussion in China concerning insolvent trading 
laws, this thesis has compared the US position in lieu of China’s. The 
equivalent of Australia’s insolvent trading laws in the US is the deepening 
insolvency theory. Since the US’s deepening insolvency laws are non-
statutory, there are no clear guidelines in establishing deepening insolvency 
as a cause of action. Different cases present different opinions of the 
necessary elements for such a cause of action, which would very likely cause 
confusion among creditors contemplating a potential action against directors. 
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Thus, Australia arguably has better creditors’ protection in the area of 
directors’ duty to prevent insolvent trading. 
One may then infer that this means that Australia provides better creditors’ 
protection than China in this area of law. However, it must be noted that 
although China’s laws are modelled on the US’s directors’ duty of deepening 
insolvency theory, the Australia and the US comparison is not an exact
Australia and China comparison. As noted in Chapter II, China’s political 
system may lead the law to develop quite differently from the US. An 
accurate comparison can only be made between Australia and China as US 
law if Chinese courts adopt the same developments in the case laws as in the
US on the issue of deepening insolvency, which of course remains to be seen.
In Chapter III, this thesis also compared Australia’s and China’s veil piercing 
doctrines and argued that Australia has better veil piercing provisions that 
protects the creditors’ interests.
Although China recognized the principle of limited liability and separate 
legal entity status in 1993, it was not until 2005 that veil piercing provisions 
were enacted into the CCL. This enactment represents a positive legal 
development to protect creditors from corporate abuses such as commingling 
of assets. These enactments are necessary in order to safeguard creditors’ 
interests in China’s rapidly changing corporate landscape due to economic 
developments.
116
Despite these developments, Australia arguably has better creditors’ 
protection in the event of shareholders’ or directors’ abuse of the corporate 
veil. The evaluation of Australia’s and China’s veil piercing laws in Chapter 
III shows that there is a great difference between both jurisdictions. China’s 
veil piercing laws are vague and limited compared to Australia’s. Judicial 
precedent is absent in China which leads to uncertainty as to when courts will 
pierce the corporate veil. Further, the laws are only enforceable against 
shareholders, hence the legal avenues for creditors are limited.
As stated in Chapter III, the difference between these two jurisdictions may 
be due to inexperienced lawmakers and to protect the state shareholders so 
that the creditors cannot take action against the state shareholders. It seems 
that the laws are protecting the SOEs because SOEs still have political 
influence in the economic development. The author has suggested some 
reforms to this poorly drafted enactment.491 The author has also suggested
that the SPC should provide clear guidance to lower courts and that the State 
Council should provide more information regarding other types of corporate 
abuses such as fraud and undercapitalisation so that companies will 
understand that Chinese courts have the potential to pierce the corporate veil 
based on these circumstances. Both these ideas are based on a gradualist 
approach to avoid any political conflict between drafters and SOEs and at the 
same time protect creditors’ interests.
It is a positive legal development that Chinese creditors are more protected 
since CCL enacted the veil piercing provisions but there is still a lot of room 
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for China to progress to ensure that creditors’ interests are better protected. 
The Chinese President, Xi Jinping has launched the anti-corruption campaign 
in November 2012, aimed at reducing and tackling corruption within the 
country.492 This presents an opportunity because the veil piercing provisions 
in the CCL may be further reformed or improved, for example, to deter 
directors from abusing the company for personal gains, thereby protecting 
creditors’ interests. 
Based on the evaluation of present laws governing Australia and China, 
Australia arguably accords better creditors’ protection, thus if creditors such 
as foreign lenders or business partners are looking to invest in well protected 
market, Australia appears to be a better choice.
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